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Diasporas for Peace: Patterns, Trends and Potential of Long-distance Diaspora 
Involvement in Conflict Settings. Case Studies from the Horn of Africa (DIASPEACE) 
is a three-year research project looking into how diaspora groups can foster peace 
and development in their countries of origin. 
DIASPEACE seeks to generate policy-relevant, evidence-based knowledge on 
how exiled populations from conflict regions play into the dynamics of peace 
and conflict in their countries of origin. In a globalised world such diaspora have 
become new forces shaping the interactions between countries, regions and 
continents. In the mainstream literature, diaspora are often seen to fuel conflict 
and exacerbate tensions through radical mobilisation along ethnic and religious 
lines. New research findings, however, show that diaspora groups are playing an 
increasingly prominent role in peace and reconciliation processes. In DIASPEACE 
the focus is on positive initiatives, while keeping in mind also the non-intended and 
negative impacts.
The project has an empirical focus on diaspora networks operating in Europe, 
which extend their transnational activities to the Horn of Africa. This is a region 
where decades of violent conflict have resulted in state collapse and the dispersal 
of more than two million people. The project involves six partners from Europe 
and two from the Horn of Africa and is based on field research conducted in both 
Europe and Africa.
DIASPEACE aims to: a) devise and test methodologies of multi-sited comparative 
research and to develop the conceptual framework for researching migrant political 
transnationalism in a conflict context; b) facilitate interaction between diaspora and 
other stakeholders in the Europe and in the Horn of Africa; c) provide policy input on 
how to better involve diaspora in conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions, 
and how to improve coherence between security, development and immigration 
policies. 
DIASPEACE consists of five main research components:
- Defining joint analytical tools and research methodologies; 
- Providing a comparative assessment of transnational diaspora networks from 
the Horn of Africa and their interfaces with European civil society and state 
institutions; 
- Case studies of diaspora as agents of conflict and peace from the Horn of 
Africa; 
- Interaction between European institutions and diasporas in conflict resolution 
and peace building; 
- Synthesis and dissemination of the research findings and identification of 
further research directions. 
The project aims to generate new knowledge to better understand diaspora’s 
potentials, expectations and experiences as bridge builders between countries of 
residence and countries of origin. 
The project is funded by the European Commission within the 7th Framework 
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement No. 217335.
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1 This paper has been co-written by a team of researchers involved in the DIASPEACE project, 
under the coordination of the ADPC. Besides the editor, all other authors have been listed in 
alphabetical order. The various sections, however, are attributed as follows: Introduction, sections 
1, 3 and 4 have been written by Giulia Sinatti with comments and input from all contributors. 
Under section 2, the case of Italy is authored by Matteo Guglielmo, Petra Mezzetti and Valeria 
Saggiomo, Germany by Andrea Warnecke, the Netherlands by Giulia Sinatti, Norway by Rojan 
Ezzati and Cindy Horst, and Finland by Päivi Pirkkalainen
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2 Including international, inter-governmental, national and sub-national institutions, 
intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and smaller civil 
society organisations (CSOs).
3 Voluntary as well as professional organisations and individuals. In the case of organisations 
exhibiting a mixed membership (diaspora and authochtonous), the organisation was considered 
to be ‘diaspora’ when the majority of board members is of diaspora background. For a broader 
definition of the concept of diaspora adopted within the DIASPEACE project see Pirkkalainen and 
Abdile (2009).
4 Case studies from the Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somali diaspora were covered, however not all 
these groups were selected for study in each country. For further details see the following section 
and, in particular, footnote 11.
This paper explores the topic of collaboration between diasporas and governmental 
and non-governmental actors in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction 
initiatives. Its purpose is to identify key policy recommendations for external parties 
wishing to establish working relationships with diasporas specifically in these fields. 
The paper therefore mainly targets an audience of policy makers, however the 
considerations in the pages that follow will be of interest also to other practitioners 
in the development field as well as to diaspora groups themselves. The paper is 
based on data collected within the DIASPEACE research project, analysing how 
external actors2 and diaspora groups3 interact in peacebuilding initiatives. The 
results discussed in this paper derive from data collected in five European countries 
(Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Finland) and focus on the specific 
case-study of diasporas originating from the Horn of Africa.4 
In the following section, a brief overview is provided of the debate on diaspora 
engagement with a specific focus on the implications in the field of peacebuilding. 
Section 2 is dedicated to the presentation of the different national case studies 
covered by the research, providing a summary of the main actors and measures 
in place in each country that provide room for diasporas to collaborate with 
other actors in peace and post-conflict reconstruction. In an attempt to assess 
existing efforts to engage diasporas in peacebuilding-relevant initiatives, this 
section takes into account the existence of specific policies linking migration 
with development, it reviews available funding opportunities accessible to the 
diaspora and it examines efforts to empower diaspora organisations. Drawing 
on a cross-country comparison, section 3 provides a more detailed discussion 
of some of the achievements and challenges faced when collaborating with 
diasporas in peacebuilding. The general migration-development environment 
enacted in the different countries emerges as playing a strong enabling role for 
diasporas to engage effectively as peacebuilding partners. Research findings, 
however, indicate that a number of other areas are also key. In particular, dealing 
with fragmented versus unitary diaspora interlocutors, defining the specific form of 
mutual collaboration and understanding the effective value added of working with 
diasporas are all factors able to influence the peacebuilding impact of collaborative 
actions. These considerations are sustained and later resumed in a concluding 
section, in which four main policy recommendations are put forward for fruitful 
collaboration between diasporas and external parties in peacebuilding.
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Migrants are increasingly regarded as promoters of development in their countries 
of origin. The migration-development debate, in fact, has rapidly evolved into an 
issue that cuts across the fields of research, policy and practice. Migrants show a 
strong commitment towards their countries of origin that translates into substantial 
transfers of financial, as well as social, cultural and human capital. In addition, 
diasporas are proven to organise themselves in their countries of residence in order 
to actively engage in community initiatives and development-oriented interventions. 
Migrants are thus believed to bring valuable contributions towards homeland 
development in an increasing number of spheres. Among these, recent research 
has highlighted that diasporas can play a significant role also in processes of 
peacebuilding and reconstruction in countries affected by conflict. Before venturing 
further into this discussion, there is a need first for a terminological clarification. 
The DIASPEACE project adopts a broad understanding of the term ‘peacebuilding’, 
which is inclusive of different kinds of development activities that are undertaken 
with a long-term commitment to create stability through the sustainable 
transformation of structural conflict in all relevant social, economic and political 
spheres.5 Diasporas can contribute in various ways to peacebuilding, responding 
to the need «to create [in their countries of origin] structures and mechanisms to 
ensure not only compliance with the terms of an [peace] agreement but a radical 
rebuilding of a more peaceful structure» that will prevent the conflict from recurring 
(Bercovitch 2007: 34). In the past, literature mostly highlighted the negative effects 
of diasporas’ influence on conflict settings. Authors variously described migrants as 
posing a risk of perpetration and transnationalisation of the conflict.6 Diasporas, in 
fact, may not only provide material and political support to the conflicting parties, 
but they may also carry attitudes of conflict with them and reproduce them within 
the diaspora. More recent contributions, however, argue that diasporas can also 
contribute positively to peacebuilding processes by engaging in initiatives that 
either directly promote profitable dialogue processes or indirectly contribute to 
economic and social advancement, thus creating the grounds for sustainable 
peace.7 Research conducted within the DIASPEACE project among diaspora groups 
from the Horn of Africa has further confirmed that the latter mobilise substantially 
for the development of their countries of origin and that a number of activities they 
undertake are peacebuilding relevant. These initiatives range from advocacy and 
lobbying in the country of residence, to the initiation of dialogue processes, to 
projects in the area of relief, development and reconstruction (Warnecke 2010).8 
Diasporas possess a unique set of relations and knowledge that derive from their 
familiarity with both the country of origin and their countries of residence. This 
qualifies diasporas as «communities of individuals who may possess resources and 
have access to international organizations, international media and powerful host 
governments» (Bercovitch 2007: 21) as well as substantial capital in the countries of 
origin, thus enabling them to cover a unique bridging position. Migrants, moreover, 
«are also seen as direct bearers of developmental objectives, reaching places to 
which other development machinery has little access and doing so without a range 
1. Diasporas as 
    peacebuilding partners
5 For further discussion of this definition see Warnecke (2010).
6 This issue has been explored by many, including Anderson (1992), Collier (2000), Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004), Demmers (2002), Duffield (2002), Kaldor (2001) and Lyons (2007). 
7 As, for instance, in the works of Cochrane (2007), Hansen (2007), Mohamoud (2006), Nyberg-
Sørensen et al. (2002), Østergaard-Nielsen (2006), Smith (2007), Rigby (2006), Warnecke (2010) 
and Zunzer (2004).
8 An alternative classification of the ways in which diaspora initiatives can have an impact on 
peacebuilding is offered in Mohamoud (2006). 
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of intermediaries» (Raghuram 2009: 104), therefore holding the potential to engage 
in critical initiatives. The importance of civil-society engagement in peacebuilding 
is widely recognised (van Leeuwen 2009) and diasporas can rightfully play a role in 
such a position. 
The widespread recognition of the general development potential of migration – 
and, more recently, of its contribution also to peace and reconstruction processes 
– has led many national, international and intergovernmental institutions to develop 
a commitment in this field by making it an explicit policy interest. The European 
Commission, for instance, has recognised diasporas as being «actors of home 
country development» and identified a number of initiatives and recommendations 
to facilitate their direct involvement (EC 2005: 6). Moreover, in the Joint Africa-
EU Strategic Partnership «African migrants were explicitly – for almost the first 
time – given an important role in the promotion of sustainable development in 
the continent» (Smith and van Naerssen 2009: 19). Within the United Nations, the 
General Assembly High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development 
paved the way to the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) in 
2005. With the aim of improving cooperation between different actors at the 
global level, furthermore, various meetings of the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development (GFMD) have been preceded by consultation days with civil society 
organisations, including diaspora ones (Matsas 2008). These initiatives testify a 
critical turn, in which «[m]igrants themselves have moved into the spotlight, with the 
result that individual migrants have emerged as important ‘agents of development’» 
(Piper 2009: 94). The active engagement of diasporas in the field of development 
cooperation has turned into a theme of growing interest not only among the global 
actors just cited, but also for individual governments, development institutions and 
NGOs.9 The recognition of the increasingly active and prominent role of diasporas 
in promoting homeland development, in fact, makes their efforts of interest for 
more traditional development cooperation actors, who feel that migrant initiatives 
may well complement their own. More specifically, in conflict-affected settings it 
is recognised that «diasporas may now act on the international stage and have 
influence on events well beyond one territory, ranging from economic cooperation to 
conflict duration» (Bercovitch 2007: 21) and that «[s]pecial attention should therefore 
be paid to opportunities for [them] to engage in programmes in the field of good 
governance and democratization processes in their countries of origin […] in peace 
making and conflict resolution» (Smith and van Naerssen 2009: 21). 
 A growing willingness to provide room for migrants and diaspora organisations 
to engage in development cooperation and peacebuilding has therefore arisen, 
based on a shared consensus «that because of their simultaneous engagement in 
two or more societies, migrants and their organisations can be effective partners for 
implementing development policies» (de Haas 2006: 4, emphasis added). 
The issue of partnership and, more broadly, of possible forms of interaction and 
collaboration between diaspora and other actors in the development field is the 
topic at the core of this paper. On the basis of research data collected within the 
DIASPEACE project, we present a critical review of the actors, measures and 
initiatives currently in place in various European countries and look at the ways 
in which these affect collaboration with diasporas in peacebuilding-relevant 
9 See, among others, AHEAD (2007), COWI/SIDA (2009), de Haas (2006), Bercovitch (2007), 
Gamlen (2008), GTZ (2009), Horst (2008), Horst and Gaas (2009), Ionescu (2006), Libercier and 
Schneider (1996), Mohamoud (2009), Nyberg–Sørensen et al. (2002), Østergaard-Nielsen (2001), 
Smith and van Naerssen (2009) and van Hear et al. (2004).
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actions.10 These cross-country experiences are used as a basis to discuss the main 
achievements and challenges in this field so far, so as to identify core areas for 
policy concern, which are presented in the form of recommendations at the end of 
the paper. The policy recommendations suggested here are therefore grounded in 
field research, making them of particular interest for external actors wishing to learn 
from existing experiences that can help them identify better ways of collaborating 
with diasporas in peacebuilding. The research-based nature of the paper, however, 
also imposes some limitations. Firstly, the data collected within DIASPEACE 
limits our knowledge to the initiatives enacted in a restricted number of European 
countries and concerning the diaspora from the Horn of Africa.11 The findings 
presented in this paper, however, still offer a valuable contribution to discussions 
that go beyond the countries and national groups considered here. Secondly, while 
recognising the importance of the measures and initiatives undertaken by actors 
in the countries of residence, this paper does not take into account the equally 
important part that can be played by the openness to collaboration of Governments 
in the countries of origin.12 Despite these limitations, the hope is that this paper 
will provide external parties with some useful indications that will assist them in 
further pursuing the active engagement of diasporas as valuable interlocutors in 
peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts in war-torn countries. 
10 The paper, however, does not attempt to provide an evaluation of the peacebuilding relevance 
of the various policies and measures it reviews, as this would have required additional data 
collection in the countries of origin.
11 More specifically fieldwork was undertaken in Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Norway covering diaspora groups originating from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. Further 
limitations of the data collected derive from the fact that not all European countries focused on 
all the diaspora groups concerned. In Italy and Finland, for instance, research was conducted 
exclusively on the case of the Somali diaspora.
12 On this important issue see, for instance, Agunias (2010), Gamlen (2006), Lacroix and Vezzoli 
(2010) and Mohamoud (2010).
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In the pages that follow an overview is provided of the main actors and measures 
encountered in countries covered by the research that provide room for diasporas 
to collaborate with other actors in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. 
As most forms of existing cooperation in this field fall under the broader policy 
framework favouring a role for diasporas as development partners, this is 
reviewed on a country basis. The section also offers a country-based overview 
of the scenario for access to funding and of existing efforts to empower diaspora 
organisations. The reader, however, should bear in mind that the overall volume 
of development cooperation (and peacebuilding) differs significantly across the 
countries considered13 and that differences in state and civil society structures 
make it impossible to estimate what share of this budget may be accessible to 
diaspora groups. An additional challenge is posed by the fact that the theme of 
migration-development, and even more so the theme of peacebuilding, often fall 
in between the mandates of different institutions and organisations. Moreover, the 
topic of diaspora engagement in peacebuilding also relates to broader immigration 
issues that are not covered in this paper, despite the fact that the integration of 
immigrants is a priority issue for many European countries. It should also be added 
that the countries covered by the research each have their own immigration history 
and that in many cases initiatives are still recent or ongoing, therefore making it 
impossible to fully assess their impact. 
2.1 Italy 14 
Italy-Somalia: a changing engagement and relationship
The Italian colonial past in Somalia strongly influences the relationships between 
the Somali diaspora and Italian institutions. During the colonial period (1890-1941) 
and the Italian Protectorate (1950-1960), Italian policy towards Somalia contributed 
to forging, in the homeland, a Somali elite that in many cases came to Italy as a 
diaspora immediately after independence (1960). During the 1970s and 1980s, 
Italian cooperation for development was deeply involved in Somalia. Cooperation 
programmes were structured within a political system in which the main Italian 
political parties (Socialist, Communist and Christian Democrats) played a leading 
role in shaping the objectives and the activities supported in the former colony; this 
informed what has been called the dominance of ‘party politics’ that influenced 
the model of interaction between the two countries, and was reflected in the 
relationships established at the individual level between Somali leaderships/elites 
and Italian politicians both in Somalia and in Italy. During this phase the Italian 
engagement model towards Somalis was mostly based on individual interactions 
between the old Somali elite and the former Italian political establishment. 
After the collapse of the Somali state (1991) and the concomitant changes that 
occurred in Italy starting from 199215, the relationships between Italy and Somalia 
2. Country profiles
13 According to OECD data, the following net disbursements (in USD millions) were devoted by 
each country to Overseas Development Assistance in 2009: Italy: 3,313.87 (equivalent to 0.16% of 
Gross National Income or GNI); Germany: 11,982.42 (0.35% of GNI); the Netherlands: 6,425.26 
(0.82% of GNI); Norway: 4,085.84 (1.06% of GNI); Finland: 1,286.14 (0.54% of GNI). Source: 
OECD StatExtracts available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx.
14 The field research in Italy focused exclusively on the case of the Somali diaspora and was 
conducted in 5 Regions/Cities (Piemonte-Turin, Lombardia-Milan, Toscana-Firenze, Lazio-
Roma and Province of Trento). A total of 24 interviews (16 to external actors and 8 to Somali 
organisations) were conducted. 22 additional interviews to Somali organisations realised in a 
previous phase of the DIASPEACE project also informed this section. Furthermore the research 
team (Petra Mezzetti, Valeria Saggiomo, Matteo Guglielmo) participated in 3 events conducting 
participant observation. 
15 These changes can be briefly summarised as follows: a) the shift from the ‘first’ to the ‘second’ 
Republic in Italy that involved the dissolution of the Socialist Party; b) the disillusionment 
regarding the Somali Conflict after the failure of the UNOSOM I Mission. 
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changed considerably. As a consequence, the individual and preferential ties which 
represented the praxis of diaspora engagement within the Italian public sphere 
became less efficient, also due to the decreasing ability of Italian political parties 
to deal with the deterioration of the Somali conflict. This period saw the decline 
of relationships established by Somali individuals at the national level, favouring 
the local/regional dimension and the consequent growth and rising role of Somali 
diaspora associations. Two additional factors account for the increased importance 
of the local dimension in diaspora engagement activities: the emerging role of 
decentralised cooperation promoted by the various regions in Italy from the Balkan 
war onward16 and the new 1998 immigration law that established social integration 
measures managed at the regional level for migrants and migrant organisations. 
With regard to decentralised cooperation, the dissolution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia opened up a period of instability and civil war in the 
Balkan region. As a consequence of geographical proximity and of an increased 
attention and sensitiveness of the Italian citizenry (especially in the northern Italian 
regions) towards this situation, this period marked the rise of new local actors 
in the cooperation field, namely Italian decentralised cooperation. Eventually, 
decentralised cooperation institutions in Italy contributed to the creation of a 
favourable environment for cooperating with civil society associations, opening new 
spaces for migrants’ participation in the respective country of residence/homeland. 
The importance of the first comprehensive immigration law approved in 1998 (Law 
40/98) lies in the fact that it included ‘social integration measures’ for migrants 
sustained at the Regional level. Regions received funds for these measures from 
the central government, therefore maximising their own importance in attracting 
migrant communities and further developing their social trajectory into Italian 
society. The combination of these two internal factors is illustrative of how national 
political developments in the host country can serve as shaping elements towards 
diaspora associationism. Changes occurring in the Italian political context, in 
fact, have directly and indirectly influenced diaspora associations and their 
organisation processes. 
With regard to the Somali diaspora in Italy, there are about four broad organisational 
categories that are active at the national and regional levels.17 Two in particular are 
relevant for this policy paper, as they present a transnational orientation towards 
Somalia either in development, or in politics and in peacebuilding. They are 
described below. 
 a) Community based organisations (CBOs), are mainly oriented towards 
integration activities in the host country; their membership is composed by 
individuals often connected to the former Somali ruling class. In the past, these 
organisations played a role as reference points for the community/newcomers 
etc.; this role eventually faded and today Somali CBOs in Italy are less structured, 
less rich in membership, to the extent that they no longer function as reference 
points. This is partly due to the extreme fragmentation which affects the Somali 
diaspora and to clan divisions and dynamics that tend to hamper the representation 
process of multi-clan associations. Transnational politics (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003) 
represents the ‘shift’ in their scopes/orientation over time. The members/leaders 
active in these associations gained experience in Italian politics and are therefore 
keen to transfer these acquired ‘competences’ (political remittances) in Somalia. 
Importantly, however, participation in transnational politics is mostly occurring at the 
16 Decentralised cooperation delivered by local authorities linking local communities/territories in 
donor countries and local communities in Third countries.
17 These are 1) community-based organisations; 2) development organisations; 3) intercultural 
organisations; and, though less prevalent, 4) youth/second generation organisations and/or 
discussion groups. 
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individual level, although operating through the associations means that the latter 
act as a ‘legitimising’ forum. 
 b) Diaspora-iniated development NGOs that implement development projects in 
Somalia, mostly in South Central and often in the places of origin of the diaspora 
organisation’s leaders and members. A great variety in the levels of formalisation 
and professionalisation can be found in this category, with associations that have 
exited the totally voluntary basis and therefore have salaried members. Some of 
these organisations have developed their capacity over time and may function just 
like any international NGO, at times even in partnership with other organisations in 
Italy and through local counterparts that are sometimes run by returnees. Within 
these organisations the clan dimension seems to be very important in order to act in 
Somalia, especially for security reasons.
 Despite the fact that since the 1990s the Somali diaspora in Italy tended to 
approach Italian institutions collectively, through associations rather than individually 
as had been the case in the past, Italian institutions at the central Governmental 
level (and in some cases also at the non-governmental level) still engage individuals 
belonging to the Somali diaspora rather than associations. This engagement is 
rather informal and is aimed at complementing the political analysis of the Somali 
conflict provided by the Italian Embassies based in Africa. Somali individuals who 
are engaged by Italian central authorities are selected on the basis of their level of 
professionalisation. This informal practice has been adopted also by Italian non-
governmental actors, who avail themselves of informal consultations with Somali 
diaspora members for their political analysis and peacebuilding policy in Somalia. 
Funding opportunities and diaspora empowerment efforts
With regard to more development-oriented and peacebuilding objectives, the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has not yet developed specific guidelines, nor 
a strategic and explicit vision for engaging diaspora groups. Dedicated funding 
mechanisms to foster the migration-development nexus or peacebuilding activities 
are so far not in place.18 
 In two cases, however, the Italian MFA has directly engaged Somali diaspora 
associations for peace and development purposes specifically in Somalia. The first 
case resulted in a highly externally driven process in which an umbrella of women’s 
diaspora associations was created under the input of the Ministry. The selection 
process however lacked the adoption of transparent and clear criteria, thus 
undermining ownership of the entire process. This experience, which represented a 
somewhat failed opportunity, had a negative influence also on the second case: the 
IOM MIDA Somalia Programme.19 Here mistrust by the Somali diaspora community 
towards the Ministry’s approach initially played a divisive role within the Somali 
community, which ended up not being fully forthcoming about new projects. Other 
more successful engagement dynamics with diaspora groups have involved the 
mediation of international organisations or NGOs. 
18 Experimental policies and ‘pilot’ projects funded by the MFA in this domain include i.e. IOM 
managed Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) Programmes, that in the Italian case 
have been oriented towards Ghana and Ethiopia (2003); Ghana and Senegal (2006) and more 
recently also include MIDA Latin America (MIDLA) Programmes and a MIDA-Somalia Project. 
These programmes have been targeting single migrants’ entrepreneurial transnational initiatives 
as well as collective social initiatives undertaken by diaspora organisations towards the town/
village/neighbourhood of origin. 
19 This has been true for the first phase of the programme. The second phase, which has just 
started, is being conducted with a different approach and through the intermediation of an 
NGO and a think tank. The programme includes capacity building; training; assistance for 
increasing transnational networking capacities among diaspora groups at the EU level; support 
to transnational projects in Somaliland and, finally, the possibility of creating a discussion forum/
network for Somali diaspora organisations in Italy.
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Local authorities, instead, have developed their own engagement approaches, that 
are however not widespread and vary in their level of structure. They represent 
rather ‘experimental initiatives’, which often depend on the level of activism towards 
migration issues, on their understanding of the potential role that migrants can play 
on their territory, on the geographical proximity with migrants’ countries of origin 
and, finally, on the numerical presence of the principal groups/communities in their 
territories. This approach is in line with the decentralisation reform that has been 
taking place in Italy since the mid 1990s. As a consequence of this ongoing process, 
each of the twenty Italian Regions developed their own norms, regulations and 
modalities of engagement with migrant communities and diasporas, and it is very 
difficult to trace a univocal model. The following three cases represent advanced, 
and to some extent exceptional, examples of engagement between the Somali 
diaspora and local authorities towards peace and development processes in the 
country of origin; these are the case of the Provincia Autonoma of Trento, the case of 
the Regione Toscana, and a specific initiative led by the Municipality of Milan. 
 The Province of Trento avails a considerable budget for financing decentralised 
cooperation activities with Third countries through local associations and NGOs. 
NGOs and associations have been applying to this budget following specific 
guidelines and a one-off registration procedure to the Province that certifies their 
capacity to operate at the international/transnational level. Diaspora associations 
and professional diaspora NGOs have also been encouraged by the local authority 
through start-up funding and training initiatives. Successful examples have involved 
diasporas from Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Togo, Brazil and from the Balkan area. 
Regione Toscana has been engaging the Somali diaspora in dialogue fora but never 
accorded any financial support to diaspora organisations directly. In this regional 
context one exception is represented by an intercultural and professionalised 
immigrant NGO that engaged local authorities directly, participating actively in a 
dialogue forum created for the purpose, building the associations’ social capital to 
be further used for achieving the associations’ objectives and priorities. 
 In 2007/2008 the Municipality of Milan launched a three year programme on co-
development for co-funding projects developed by diaspora organisations towards 
their countries of origin, with the aim of simultaneously sustaining initiatives that 
have an impact on migrants’ integration processes in the territories of residence. 
Two calls for proposals were issued between 2007-2010 with an overall budget of 
about € 2 million. Between the two calls a training course on how to draft projects 
and how to manage associations was also offered to diaspora organisations. 
The examples mentioned above represent three different models of engagement: 
Trento is a virtuous diaspora engagement model in which diaspora NGOs 
implementing development and peacebuilding projects in their country of origin 
apply and receive funding directly from the local authority; Regione Toscana 
represents a ‘two-ways’ diaspora engagement model, which unfolds in direct 
engagement for dialogue initiatives, while it is indirect for delivering financial 
support and management, as the latter go preferably to autochthonous NGOs that 
are considered more ‘reliable’ and that in turn can engage diaspora organisations; 
the Municipality of Milan represents a mixed model compared to the first two, as 
the Municipality directly sustains diaspora organisations financially, trying also to 
favour – as a guarantee factor but also in a broader cooperation approach/vision 
– partnerships with autochthonous NGOs, Universities, the Private sector, etc. 
including diaspora organisations at the transnational level. A few Somali diaspora 
associations actively participated in the calls for proposals with their initiatives.
Whereas there have been some examples of government initiatives on the local 
level, engagement of Somali diaspora individuals or groups by Italian NGOs are 
generally scarce and relate to the early/pre-civil war period. These interactions 
started off with the involvement of Somali individuals (informants, key witnesses, 
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opponents of the Regime, etc.) and were later consolidated in the form of personal 
ties and relationships that in many cases are still active and successful (both at 
the individual level as well as at the organisational level). With regard to Somali 
people/groups that arrived in Italy from the mid 1990s onward, interaction and 
engagement with NGOs have been seriously compromised by a climate of mutual 
suspiciousness and mistrust. 
In conclusion, engagement dynamics of Somali diaspora associations on behalf 
of Italian institutional actors do not follow a vertical model, characterised by the 
existence of explicit and strategic objectives/policies and guidelines for engaging 
diasporas, both within the country of residence and towards the country of origin. 
Instead, they follow a horizontal and highly decentralised model, in which the 
various actors follow different approaches, in line with their sensitiveness and 
openness towards diasporas’ various needs and with the perceived potential 
contribution of diaspora groups towards the institutions’ own priorities/projects. 
The local dimension in the Italian case stems as the most dynamic as opposed to 
engagement strategies towards diaspora groups implemented by institutions at 
the national level. A tradition of engaging Somali diaspora individuals rather than 
associations is another feature that characterised the Italian case until the 1990s. 
Although this is no longer the prevailing strategy for interactions that are being 
initiated today, in many cases it has favoured the establishment of long-lasting 
relationships that still remain active. 
2.2 Germany 20   
The interest in diasporas as transnational actors, and the very recent political 
recognition that Germany needs a pro-active and comprehensive approach to 
migration and integration policies has brought about a wealth of initiatives and 
projects, but also some new institutions that all seek to contribute to this process. 
Within this wider context, the migration-development nexus has gained some 
prominence over the past five to six years, with a wide spectre of conferences, 
studies and pilot projects having been commissioned. In general, it appears that 
initiatives in Germany focus on funding and the professionalisation of migrant 
organisations, fostering networks and testing different forms of cooperation in 
the course of pilot programmes. Depending on the institutional background of the 
non-diaspora actors, the overall objective of these initiatives is either to harness 
the development potential of migrants, or to improve their integration into German 
civil society structures. Only one institution was found to have projects that are 
jointly implemented with migrant organisations with an explicit peacebuilding focus, 
however when applying a broader concept of peacebuilding many other interesting 
cooperation experiences were observed. 
Institutional initiatives at the federal level
In Germany, official development cooperation is defined by the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and mainly implemented, among 
others, by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the KfW Banking Group, and 
InWEnt (Capacity Building International). Most initiatives at the federal level to foster 
the positive effects of international migration have been devised and implemented 
20 Data collection in Germany was based on an initial mapping exercise that allowed the 
identification of several relevant institutions. In total, 20 interviews (including 8 representatives of 
diaspora organisations, 8 NGOs, 5 governmental institutions and semi-governmental institutions) 
were conducted. In addition, various diaspora and migrant meetings, regional conferences, 
seminars and workshops were attended. The data collection team was composed of Clara Schmitz-
Pranghe, Ruth Vollmer and Andrea Warnecke.
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by these organisations that are also represented in the ministry’s coordinating body 
(Thementeam) on “Migration and Development”. 
In 2003, the GTZ organised two conferences on “Migration and Development” 
and began to conduct a series of studies on the capacities of specific diaspora 
groups to get engaged in development projects in their countries of origin.21 
In 2007, following the establishment of the Migration and Development Sector 
Project (Sektorvorhaben), the GTZ established a pilot programme on behalf of 
the BMZ to enhance non-profit diaspora engagement. This programme targets 
organised diaspora groups in Germany and provides them with the opportunity 
to implement projects in their countries of origin in collaboration with the GTZ. 
So far, 26 projects have been funded (out of about 100 applications). Successful 
applications usually focused on capacity building and in many cases project ideas 
were further developed to tap into the respective diaspora organisation’s particular 
abilities and capacities. In this regard, ongoing intensive contacts were ensured 
between one of GTZ’s experts and the migrant organisations, ensuring continuous 
support throughout the application and implementation process. Following the 
conclusion of its second stage in May 2010, the programme has recently been 
extended until December 2010. A practical guide “Cooperating with Diaspora 
Communities” (GTZ 2010) was published earlier this year summing up GTZ’s 
experiences and recommendations in the field. The guidelines point to the role of 
suitable intermediary institutions, the existence of functioning partnerships with 
organisations in countries of origin, sensitivity to political attitudes, and they provide 
examples of different kinds of cooperation. 
InWEnt (Capacity Building International) is a state-owned non-profit organisation 
that provides trainings and seminars in the fields of human resource development, 
intercultural exchange, and development. Within Germany, a core objective is to 
provide information and education on development-related issue areas and to 
support development activities initiated on the regional and local levels. For this 
purpose, the Service Agency – Communities in One World22 was established in 
2001 to support and accompany the development initiatives and capacities of 
local authorities and actors. With regard to migrant organisations, the department 
has implemented a pilot project entitled “Migration and development on the local 
level” to improve the cooperation between One World initiatives, local institutions 
and migrant organisations through networking events and seminars in five ‘model’ 
communities. A central finding of the pilot was the fact that these initiatives can only 
be implemented through long-term dedicated efforts at the grassroots level and 
require a strong commitment by local authorities. For this reason, the field “Migration 
and development on the local level” will become one of the three core working areas 
of the Service Agency. InWEnt also currently revises its internal project portfolio with 
a view to introducing ‘migration’ as a cross-cutting issue in other programme areas 
as well. With regard to financial support, InWEnt operates two funding schemes on 
behalf of the BMZ, both of which focus on development-related information and 
education in Germany, but vary significantly regarding the funding available for 
individual projects. The BMZ also directly offers funding to private development 
actors working in partner countries of German development cooperation. 
According to Bengo (an advisory body that assists prospective applicants during 
the proposal stages), 21 migrant organisations working in (mostly West-) African 
21 The studies can be downloaded from http://www.gtz.de/de/themen/wirtschaft-beschaeftigung/
23881.htm. With regard to sub-Sahara Africa, diaspora communities from Ghana, Ethiopia, 
Senegal, and Cameroon were covered.
22 Servicestelle Kommunen in der Einen Welt (SKEW).
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countries have successfully applied for project funding between 1997 and June 
2010, implementing a total of 36 projects.
Finally, in September 2009, the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 
(BAMF) launched a two-year initiative entitled “Intensified Participation of Migrant 
Organisations”. The objective of this initiative is to facilitate collaboration between 
migrant organisations and other CSOs/NGOs by encouraging them to submit joint 
project proposals to the BAMF.23 So far, about 200 proposals have been submitted. 
Although this pilot project somewhat mirrors the one run by the GTZ, the major 
focus of the initiative lies on improving the integration of migrant organisations in 
local civil society and institutional structures by encouraging different forms of 
collaboration: ‘tandem partnerships’, cooperation partnerships, and mentoring.24 
Governmental initiatives and NGO collaboration at the state level25
In the state of North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW), there are several state and non-state 
actors who cooperate with and empower migrant organisations from sub-Saharan 
African states.26 Over the past five years, a very dense network between these 
external actors has evolved which is hard to disentangle. Since the late 1990s, 
the previous regional governments had discussed instruments to support the 
activities of migrant organisations and gather more in-depth information on this 
rather unknown field of actors (MASSKS 1999, Jungk 2005). A first funding line for 
migrant organisations was established in 1997, which until 2005 funded about 20 
organisations per annum, covering projects but also institutional funding. Much 
of the current interest in cooperating with diaspora or migrant organisations from 
sub-Saharan African states has been stimulated by the Ministry for Intergenerational 
Affairs, Family, Women and Integration (MGFFI), which was created in 2005 by 
the newly elected conservative-liberal state government. The MGFFI was the first 
German ministry with an explicit and prominent focus on integration affairs.27 As 
early as 2005, the decision was taken to target activities in the fields of “Migration, 
Integration and Development” on migrant groups from sub-Sahara Africa (MGFFI 
2007). As the ministry was also responsible for international cooperation on the 
state level, it was in the rather unique position to connect migration/integration 
policies with transnational/international objectives. It sought to foster migrants’ 
transnational activities by commissioning studies, organising training and capacity 
building seminars, supporting networking activities, funding projects in Germany 
23 The project is funded by BAMF, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and the Federal 
Ministry of Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ).
24 Additional detailed information on the projects funded so far can be viewed under: http://
www.integration-in-deutschland.de/cln_110/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Integration/
Downloads/Integrationsprojekte/modellprojekte,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/
modellprojekte.pdf.
25 In addition to covering initiatives on the federal level, research was conducted on state initiatives 
in North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW). Firstly, home to roughly 18 million people, NRW is by far the 
most populous state in Germany and also has the highest overall number of migrant inhabitants, 
be they citizens of sub-Saharan African countries or naturalized German citizens. Secondly, NRW 
has effectively taken the lead regarding migration-development initiatives, as most practical 
efforts towards fostering cooperation between state / non-state actors and diaspora organisations 
have been developed and tested in NRW. 
26 As the majority of sub-Saharan migrants in NRW originate from Ghana, the DR Congo, and 
Nigeria, some projects and programmes explicitly focus on these countries of origin.
27 Following the recent state elections, these sectoral competences have recently been redefined 
and the issue of integration will be covered by the Ministry for Labour and Integration, while 
international cooperation has been moved to the state chancellery.
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and in developing countries (via InWEnt), and organising events in the fields of 
migration and development also via other regional actors such as the One World 
Network NRW e.V. (EWN), and the Unit for Migration and Development.
In addition to the InWEnt Service Agency in Bonn, InWEnt’s regional centre for NRW 
in Düsseldorf also runs two funding programmes on behalf of the state government, 
which also, though not exclusively, target migrant organisations: 1) a small funding 
line for NGOs and associations that plan to implement development projects abroad 
(Auslandsprojekte); and 2) a funding line for providing information and education 
on development-related issues within Germany. In both cases, there is a strong 
focus on supporting and advising particularly migrant organisations throughout the 
application process. At the utmost, 30 to 40 development projects can be funded 
p.a., out of which on average five to seven are run by migrant organisations.
 
The One World Network (EWN) is a federation of about 250 associations and 
1,100 additional individual members that focus on development and intercultural 
exchange in NRW. Its overall objective is to foster and enhance development 
activities on the regional and local levels. Together with InWEnt, in 2005 the 
One World Network re-launched28 the Koordinatorenprogramm (Coordinators’ 
Programme) on behalf of the state government. This programme is meant to 
improve the coordination of activities and initiatives on the grassroots level by 
facilitating cooperation among stakeholders in different regions of NRW (regional 
coordinators) as well as cooperation centred around specific issue areas (thematic 
coordinators). The programme presently comprises 12 regional coordinators and 10 
thematic units (Fachstellen), including one unit and coordinator for “Migration and 
Development”. The Unit for Migration and Development (Fachstelle Migration und 
Entwicklung) was commissioned by the MGFFI in 2006 and is based at the Forum 
for Social Innovations in Solingen. Its main purpose is to foster and accompany 
networking processes among African diaspora and migrant organisations and to 
support this process by offering assistance, training seminars and exchange fora. 
Following a kick-off workshop bringing together interested actors in 2006, a series 
of so-called regional conferences was launched to bring together a broad range 
of organisations in the different regions of NRW. Targeted organisations include 
migrant organisations, development associations, universities, churches, charitable 
organisations, and local councils. 
One of the prime successes of these sustained, regional, and bottom-up networking 
processes is the establishment of regional African networking associations in different 
parts of NRW, which were initiated by diaspora members. Another recent success 
that was also supported through the networking activities is the inclusion of African 
representatives in the newly elected integration councils in ten cities/municipalities 
earlier this year. Together with InWEnt, the Service Agency, the MGFFI, the Stiftung 
Umwelt und Entwicklung and local authorities, capacity seminars are organised 
to improve the professional skills of organisations as a follow-up to the regional 
conferences. These seminars are highly sought after by diaspora representatives 
and usually focus on funding procedures and additional organisational skills. While 
these seminars clearly have a technical focus, they are also important for overcoming 
barriers between the diaspora on the one hand and other institutional actors on the 
other. The close cooperation of state and non-state actors in NRW has contributed 
to facilitating greater visibility, improving capacities and improving local structures 
and networks. According to several interviewees, however, many migrants still find 
28 A smaller preceding programme (Promotorenprogramm) had already been initiated by the One 
World Network and InWEnt in 1996, albeit not yet with an explicit focus on migration.
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it difficult to access local formal and informal structures, and to gather relevant 
information. Diaspora members are hardly ever among the staff of larger institutions, 
which are in turn perceived by many migrants as inaccessible and powerful actors 
whose priorities or funding principles are little known.
NGOs and CSOs
In Germany, there is a high number of registered associations (about 500,000, 50% 
of which are recognised as charitable organisations), as well as a broad range of 
foundations, trade unions and church institutions and institutes that implement 
projects and programmes, some of which also target migrant organisations. While 
some of these run special programmes in the field of migration-development or 
offer funding, others, especially the smaller grassroots initiatives, play a significant 
role during the earlier stages of organisational development by providing long-term 
structural support and facilities. Charitable organisations such as Caritas, Workers’ 
Welfare Association (AWO), or the Paritaetischer Wohlfahrtsverband (DPWV), 
primarily provide advice and support to individual migrants on a wide variety of 
issues. Some of these charities also provide (limited) financial and bureaucratic 
support to migrant and refugee associations to help develop initial structures 
and find access to other actors. Several One World initiatives / development 
organisations supply similar forms of support, particularly by offering meeting 
rooms, language classes, providing contacts with other organisations and advice 
on funding, relevant actors etc. According to several of our interviewees, these 
very open, i.e. little specialised, and long-term structural forms of support are 
vital for migrants in that they help to overcome structural barriers and disseminate 
information and contacts that are otherwise hard to find especially for less-well 
integrated migrants.
Despite its relatively recent engagement in this field, Germany has made some 
progress in promoting and implementing migrant involvement in the development 
field. Initiatives at the federal level are complemented by those initiated at the 
state level. In this respect, NRW has taken the lead, developing and testing ways 
of establishing cooperation between external actors and diaspora organisations. 
With regard to systematic approaches and programmes to empower migrant 
organisations, the two priorities among external actors in Germany appear to be 
funding and networking. However, a preliminary review of recent pilot programmes 
offering funding to migrant organisations indicates that formal and institutional 
prerequisites are still very high for smaller migrant organisations. When addressing 
this gap, it seems inevitable to also improve the chances and perspectives for 
individual migrants to participate in the labour market and other social spheres, 
thereby fostering their overall social integration, in addition to providing institutional 
support and services.
2.3 The Netherlands 29
The Netherlands host numerous organisations with an interest in peacebuilding 
and, more broadly, offer a conducive environment for the engagement of diasporas 
as partners in the development field. This translates into a number of cases for 
29 This section is based on 18 in-depth interviews (3 with institutional actors at the governmental 
and intergovernmental level, 12 with NGOs and CSOs, 3 with diaspora organisations). These 
were identified following a mapping exercise identifying the main actors active in the field of 
peacebuilding and/or engaging with diaspora in the Netherlands. This material was further 
integrated with the analysis of 22 documents (policy memoranda, project documents, evaluation 
reports and publications), as well as with observations conducted at 5 relevant public events. 
Material deriving from previous research undertaken by the ADPC within DIASPEACE was also 
consulted. The ADPC wishes to acknowledge the work of Laura Eggens, Inge Ortelee and Robert 
Veldwijk who contributed to the data collection and to the drafting of a field report that has 
largely inspired this section.
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possible collaboration between diaspora organisations and third parties in actions 
that are peacebuilding-relevant.
A strong commitment at the national level
The assumption that diaspora organisations can and should be more involved 
in development programmes because they can be a valuable actor in this field 
is widely-held in the Netherlands. At the national level, as far back as the 1970s 
the Dutch Government started policies and programmes that have been labelled 
as «migration and development avant la lettre» (de Haas 2006: 32). At the time, 
the Dutch Government was involved in supporting migrants wishing to return 
to their countries of origin to use their skills and resources to the advantage of 
local development, representing one of the first attempts worldwide to combine 
migration policies and international development co-operation (Bonjour 2005, de 
Haas 2006, Obdeijn 1987). Over the years and through the publication of three 
policy Memoranda on migration-development (in 1996, 2004 and 2008),30 the 
perspective of the Dutch Government has been refined, shifting from a strong 
interest for return migration31 to a broader and more inclusive understanding of the 
relation between migration and development. In particular, the 2008 Memorandum 
includes among its policy priorities a will to strengthen the involvement of migrant 
organisations and to engage them directly as development actors. The document 
states that: «[m]igrants’ activities can bring added value to the development of 
their countries of origin. Migrants have useful networks, and are often better 
acquainted with legislation in their countries of origin. […] Migrants’ added value 
can also consist in a bridging function. Increased cooperation between traditional 
Dutch development organisations and migrant organisations can maximise this 
potential» (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008: 54-55). A joint effort of the 
Minister for Development Cooperation and of the State Secretary for Justice, the 
2008 Memorandum confirms the Netherlands’ pioneering position in the field of 
migration-development policy and testifies the country’s explicit attempt to identify 
shared views and strategies that cut across different Government departments and 
ministries. In addition, the Division for Consular Affairs and Migration (DCM) of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is mandated to mainstream an attention for migration also 
across other Divisions. 
The DCM also promotes a yearly consultation that is open to the participation of 
different diaspora organisations, in which their role is discussed as development 
partners, as well as in the definition of policies towards their countries of origin 
and in the international arena.32 Within this framework, for instance, the diaspora 
recently played an active role in the pre-consultation sessions that took place for 
the latest GFMD, therefore ensuring that it is part of the discussion at the policy 
level. Some of the consultations promoted by the Dutch Government have a direct 
relevance for diaspora engagement specifically in the field of peacebuilding. 
Following an exploratory study on the potential for peacebuilding of diasporas 
originating from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region commissioned by the 
Division for Sub-Saharan Africa (DAF) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mohamoud 
2005), diaspora groups are regularly invited to take part in consultation meetings 
30 For further insight into the policy Memoranda of 1996 and 2004 see Bonjour (2004), de Haas 
(2006), Hermele (1997), IOM (2008). 
31 That still remains visible in a number of projects run in partnership with the IOM for the 
permanent or temporary return of foreign nationals to their countries of origin. 
32 Further details on these indirect efforts to involve diasporas in policy formulation are illustrated 
in Groot and Gibbons (2007) and in an IOM report on engaging diasporas as development 
partners (Ionescu 2006: 24-25).
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and workshops. Some of these have involved specific national diaspora groups 
from East Africa and from the Horn, such as the Sudanese and, more recently, the 
Somalis. These initiatives reflect a constructive approach to the peace process in 
these countries that is inclusive of dialogue with their diasporas. 
Alongside the regular search for dialogue opportunities through consultation, the 
Dutch Government supports an active role of diaspora in development in a number 
of additional ways. The policy Memorandum declares a commitment to strengthen 
the capacity of the diaspora by stating that «[t]he government would like migrant 
organisations to set up their own umbrella organisation, or a similar construction 
[…]. It is prepared to offer them assistance in doing so» (Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2008: 56). In addition, the Dutch Government is open to provide funding to 
suitably qualified diaspora organisations. In this sense, a few cases exist of direct 
financial support from the Government to diaspora organisations,33 however the 
majority of funding for diaspora development initiatives is channelled indirectly 
through the Dutch system of co-financing organisations. 
Co-financing Agencies and Linkis
The co-financing system has been in place in the Netherlands since 1980 and it 
sees the Government channel «substantial structural funds to a small number of 
Dutch development NGOs known as co-financing agencies. Traditionally, the most 
prominent of these co-financing agencies (CFAs) have been Oxfam Novib, Cordaid 
(Catholic), ICCO (Protestant) and Hivos (Humanist)» (de Haas 2006: 32). The CFAs 
rely on a significant budget with which they support the projects of civil society 
organisations. The supposed aim is to offer an alternative channel to bilateral and 
multilateral aid in which private initiatives and face-to-face relations with partners 
are favoured. This setup offers the principal means for diaspora organisations to 
access funding for their own projects. Diaspora organisations, in fact, alongside 
other Netherlands-based civil society organisations, can approach the co-financing 
organisations through their Front Offices that deal with requests for support and 
funding. Since 2004 this contact has been facilitated through the establishment 
of the Linkis platform.34 Outcome of a coalition between the CFAs together with 
NCDO 35 and COS-Nederland 36, Linkis is a digital information window where the 
organisations cooperate in providing advice and support to organisations that are 
searching for information or funds for their initiatives in the development field. Some 
of the Linkis promoters have a target of approving a certain quota of interventions 
presented by diaspora organisations, although this is not specifically mentioned 
in the Linkis strategy. In addition to Linkis, smaller funding opportunities exist in 
33 Among these SEVA Network Foundation, a Hindu diaspora organisation that is now recognised 
as a fully fledged development NGO and receives Thematische Medefinanciering subsidies (TMF) 
granted by the Government to civil society organisations involved in development cooperation. 
The African Diaspora Policy Centre is another example of a young diaspora organisation that 
receives direct funding from the Ministry for its projects.
34 Low-Threshold Initiatives Contact and Information Centre for International Cooperation. See 
www.linkis.nl.
35 National Commission for international cooperation and Sustainable Development. The NCDO 
assists people and organisations in the Netherlands who wish to engage in development work 
through support with advice and subsidies. Through its Small-Scale Local Activities (KPA) 
programme, for instance, it provides funding for small scale development projects. 
See www.ncdo.nl.
36 The Netherlands Local Development Cooperation Centre is a nationwide, independent 
association of Dutch centres for international cooperation, organised in a national office and 
various local offices. This delocalised structure allows COS to be uniquely embedded in the 
different regions. See www.cossen.nl.
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the Netherlands that specifically target diaspora organisations, such as the yearly 
ideeënwedstrijd contest awarding € 10,000 of seed funding to the best project ideas 
presented by migrants.37
Despite this relatively rich funding scenario for diasporas to engage directly in 
development and peacebuilding, other factors may however condition the effective 
possibility for this to happen. The Dutch Government, for instance, establishes a list 
of partner countries that are eligible for development assistance.38 The exclusion 
of certain countries from the list makes it more difficult for diaspora members of 
that nationality to access public funds for development purposes in their countries 
of origin. This can be partly compensated by CFAs and NGOs, who also have their 
own lists of priority countries and might intervene in some of those that are not 
covered by the Dutch Government.39 Thanks to the funding opportunities in place 
in the Netherlands, diaspora organisations from the Horn of Africa have received 
direct support to implement a variety of activities that can have an impact on 
peace processes in the country of origin, such as awareness raising campaigns, 
conferences, lobbying initiatives and development projects.40
Diaspora empowerment, consultation and partnership
Alongside facilitating access to project funding through Linkis, alternative efforts to 
empower the diaspora are undertaken by various external actors in the Netherlands. 
Some co-financing agencies had longstanding collaborations with diaspora 
organisations long before the creation of the Linkis platform. The organisations that 
merged to form today’s Cordaid,41 in particular, had a long history of collaborating 
with migrant organisations that dates back to the 1980s and 1990s. Oxfam Novib is 
another prominent CFA currently playing a key role in the empowerment of diaspora 
organisations. The NCDO and COS Nederland are also active in supporting 
diaspora initiatives. Activities aiming at reinforcing the diaspora in the Netherlands 
largely take the form of strengthening or favouring the establishment of diaspora 
networks and platforms, promoting migrant lobby and advocacy, and providing 
capacity building training. 
On the one hand, the existence of many small diaspora organisations is a source of 
frustration for many Dutch actors, who call for more unifying umbrella organisations 
with clear representatives. While they understand the reasons behind a fragmented 
diaspora, they prefer to collaborate with a group that has ‘one voice’. On the 
other hand, diaspora groups have become increasingly aware of the value of 
working together. A number of diaspora network organisations have thus been 
established, out of the initiative of different diaspora groups and, in some cases, 
with the assistance and guidance of supporting third parties.42 Some of these 
37 The initiative is supported by Cordaid, SMS and Oikos. See www.ideeenwedstrijd.nl. 
38 The full list, which may be subject to periodic revision, is available in the latest policy 
Memorandum on migration and development (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008).
39 For the countries covered by DIASPEACE, for instance, Eritrea and Somalia are not eligible for 
funding from the Dutch Government but they are focal countries for large organisations such as 
Oxfam Novib and Care Nederland. 
40 For a discussion of the nature of activities promoted in the Netherlands by diaspora 
organisations from the Horn of Africa and the ways in which they are peacebuilding relevant see 
Warnecke et al. (2009) and Warnecke (2010).
41 I.e. the Dutch CFA Bilance with Memisa Medicus Mundi and Mensen in Nood. 
42 Among the most notable examples are the already mentioned SEVA Network Foundation, 
SMS and MOS (supported largely by Cordaid), the Diaspora Forum for Development (DFD) and 
Multicultural Women Peacemakers Network (MWPN, both supported by Oxfam Novib).
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organisations have a strong peacebuilding relevance, either when a multi-national 
group commits to a peace-related focus (as in the case of the Multicultural Women 
Peacemakers Network), or when diaspora groups of one nationality set up unifying 
networks (such as ENNOS and NedSom for the Ethiopian and Somali diasporas 
respectively). Membership in such alliances allows diaspora organisations to learn 
from each other and to identify shared strategies and initiatives, thereby improving 
coordination as well as facilitating dialogue with external parties. Some of these 
organisations, in fact, have become valuable actors in the development scene, 
however critics have also raised the concern that there could be a risk of some of 
these initiatives being donor-driven. 
 Many of the efforts of Dutch actors involving diaspora focus also on 
strengthening the capacity of these networks as well as of smaller diaspora 
organisations. Training is an area in which many external parties invest. While 
covering a vast array of skills needed to implement projects independently in 
the development field, some of these trainings aim specifically at equipping 
diaspora members with peacebuilding relevant tools. In this vein, various NGOs, 
CSOs and Dutch Universities have established joint training programmes that 
specifically target the diaspora. The African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC) and the 
United Network of Young Peacebuilders (UNOY) have many years of experience 
conducting similar training. The courses not only allow diasporas to enhance their 
peacebuilding skills, but they also serve as an important opportunity for contact to 
be established between diaspora organisations and potential external collaborators.
In addition to these measures, some Dutch development organisations have 
adopted internal staff diversification policies, favouring the recruitment of 
candidates with a diaspora background. This can be seen as a long-term diaspora 
empowerment measure insofar as it has favoured the professionalization of diaspora 
individuals, creating the grounds for acquired qualifications and experience to feed 
back into diaspora organisations.
Additional ways in which diaspora and external parties collaborate in peacebuilding-
relevant spheres are represented by consultation processes, the use of diaspora 
experts and the establishment of full partnerships in the achievement of 
development objectives. Alongside the consultation processes promoted directly 
by the Dutch Government described above, other actors have involved diasporas in 
similar ways. As part of the activities of its peacebuilding department, for instance, 
ICCO organised a number of meetings, public debates and expert gatherings with 
the aim of actively involving the Sudanese-Dutch Diaspora in peace initiatives in 
Sudan (Mohamoud 2004). In the light of migration-development having become 
a popular trend, other organisations have opened up their own activities, inviting 
diaspora to get directly involved as experts or resource persons. Many training and 
awareness-raising campaigns foresee the participation of migrants, opening up a 
window of opportunity for diaspora to participate and to broaden public knowledge 
of the situation in their countries. The IOM has also established a fruitful working 
relationship with diaspora individuals and organisations. In particular within its 
Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) programme, the IOM relies on the 
assistance of Ethiopian actors to disseminate information about the project among 
individual Ethiopians interested in returning to their country of origin for a limited 
period to contribute to local development. 
More explicit forms of collaboration between diaspora and external actors are to 
be found in relatively few cases of full partnership for the joint implementation of a 
project. In these cases the diaspora and external actor are on a par in a relationship 
that sees them share roles and responsibilities for the co-running of a project. 
An example is offered by the collaboration between Care Nederland and the 
Somali diaspora organisation NedSom in the Diaspora Partnership Programme. 
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This project aimed at improving the capacity of local organisations in Puntland 
and Somaliland, while enhancing the role of the diaspora in the rehabilitation 
process. Although lacking an explicit peacebuilding focus, the programme wished 
to directly address some of the root causes behind the conflict by strengthening 
local civil society. In a similar vein to IOM’s TRQN programme, professionals from 
the diaspora went to their country of origin on short term assignments. Although 
this programme (concluded in 2008) did not have a direct follow-up, many of the 
diaspora involved at the time are frequently still acting as consultants in Somalia. 
The establishment of this partnership represents an interesting way for diasporas 
to participate in more substantial projects than those possible through the support 
of Linkis. As an established senior partner, Care was able to meet the necessary 
requirements for the funders that diaspora organisations often lack. The issue of 
access to resources and funding for large-scale projects is, in fact, still difficult 
for diaspora organisations in the Netherlands. Alongside the Care-NedSom 
example, other attempts exist to overcome this difficulty. In the recently held call for 
applications for the latest co-financing subsidy round,43 for instance, Oxfam Novib 
presented its programme in the form of an alliance in which diaspora organisations 
were incorporated, including organisations from the Horn of Africa. The latter 
thus face the opportunity of accessing structural funds that can be put towards 
strengthening many peace-relevant projects promoted in the country of origin.44 
In all, the Dutch context offers various possibilities for diasporas to contribute to 
peacebuilding. Recognising the dedication and drive that diaspora organisations 
and individuals have, many external actors prove an inclination to establish dialogue 
and collaboration with the diaspora. Diaspora organisations have also (albeit to 
a small extent) become competitors for funds and they have become a far more 
visible actor on the Dutch development scene. They have come to realise the 
value of working together both with other diaspora organisations and with external 
parties. The culture of the development sector in the Netherlands however also 
restricts the engagement of diaspora in peacebuilding activities in several ways. 
Particularly when it comes to organisations (or divisions within organisations) that 
have a specific thematic focus on peacebuilding, in fact, many projects are still 
implemented by Dutch external actors without the involvement of diaspora.
2.4 Norway 45
Norway has a relatively recent migration history and as such, initiatives to engage 
diasporas in peacebuilding are also very recent. Most of the focus on diaspora 
engagement has been in relation to development cooperation, and has been guided 
by policy documents and governmental initiatives. Among NGOs, cooperation with 
migrant groups in Norway who are engaging transnationally is very recent and 
largely stimulated by national-level government policy. At the same time, Norway 
has an active civil society life consisting of small-scale voluntary initiatives and 
43 MFS2, for the period 2011-2015.
44 Reference is, in particular, to the Somali diaspora organisation Hirda. The peacebuilding 
potential of its activities is discussed in Mohamoud (2005) and Otieno (2010). 
45 This section is based on research carried out by Karin Afeef, Marta Bivand Erdal, Rojan Ezzati 
and Cindy Horst. After a mapping exercise of all potential governmental and non-governmental 
actors engaging diasporas, 15 interviews and 2 focus group discussions were conducted (4 
interviews and 1 focus group with government employees, 9 with NGOs, 2 with CBOs and a 
focus group discussion with diaspora organisations benefiting from the Pilot Project Pakistan). 
Furthermore, 15 events were observed or existing reports of events were analysed. And finally, 
28 documents from governmental and non-governmental actors were analysed including policy 
documents, speeches, yearly reports, field trip reports. 
23
Diasporas as partners 
in conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding
places great value on solidarity initiatives by Norwegian citizens spread across the 
vast country in often quite isolated areas. As such, whereas it is possible here to 
present a relatively complete overview of national-level initiatives, it is impossible 
to provide an overview of all local-level initiatives.46 Whereas diaspora engagement 
initiatives that focus specifically on engagement with peacebuilding are rare it is 
important to note that, among the ten largest non-western immigrant communities 
in Norway, six originate from conflict or post-conflict settings.47 As such, in practice 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction will need to be addressed when 
engaging with these groups.
Governmental level
With the increasing international interest over the past decade, among others 
observed in the ongoing Migration-Development forums at government level, 
Norway has become an active participant in international debates. This political 
interest, strongly facilitated by the personal dedication of individuals like Minister of 
the Environment and International Development Erik Solheim, has led to the creation 
of a migration-development project. This project ran from 2007 to 2009, allowing 
one senior and one junior staff to work on ‘mainstreaming’ migration-development 
thinking into the ministry, Norad and beyond. The unit has furthermore attempted 
to establish synergies between work done within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), in particular on development, and other ministries working on issues related 
to migration, immigrants and integration in Norway – in particular the Ministry 
of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion.48 An important aim of the Norwegian 
government’s work on Migration and Development has been to seek to integrate 
different ministries, with different responsibilities and agendas, in an effort to 
bring together policies which are related. While this is something that is stressed 
repeatedly, it is doubtful this aim has been achieved yet as initiatives were mainly 
established within the MFA, through the former migration-development project, 
Peace and Reconciliation and regional units. There seems to be interest within the 
Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion as well, but as this is not matched 
with explicit policies on the topic yet, so far this has not really led to any action.49
The Norwegian Government highlights the importance of including diaspora groups 
in development cooperation and foreign policy in White papers no 13 (2008-2009), 
Climate, conflict and capital: Norwegian development policy adapting to change, 
and no 15 (2008-2009), Interests, responsibilities and possibilities: Main contours of 
Norwegian foreign policy. This policy is further reflected in the Norwegian Agency 
for Development Cooperation (Norad)’s Principles for Support to Civil Society in the 
South, revised in May 2009, as the last of these six principles is dedicated solely 
to promoting diaspora participation in development work. These three documents 
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009a and 2009b, Norad 2009) provide a 
good overview of Norwegian government policy, discussing why it is important to 
engage diaspora groups and what resources diaspora members have (Erdal and 
Horst 2010: 9).
46 Research concentrated on the Oslo area.
47 In 2009, the ten largest groups were: Iraq (19,197), Somalia (17,255), Pakistan (16,615), Iran 
(13,001), Vietnam (12,803), Philippines (11,033), Thailand (10,647), Turkey (10,039), Sri Lanka 
(8,450) and Afghanistan (7,809).
48 And to a smaller extent the Ministries of Justice and Finance.
49 It is important to note that the situation is very dynamic and currently important decisions are 
being made on the future of diaspora engagement in Norway, following a review of Pilot Project 
Pakistan. It is not unlikely this Ministry will have a more extensive role in the years to come.
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In these policy documents, the Norwegian government lists a number of important 
reasons justifying the importance of engaging members of the diaspora in 
development cooperation (see also Erdal and Horst 2010: 9-10). Firstly, Norway is 
home to large numbers of immigrants and Norwegians with migrant backgrounds. 
The ‘new’ Norway opens up for new possibilities where the Norwegian society will 
benefit greatly from a policy that allows for increased participation in foreign policy 
and development cooperation (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009b: 70). 
The documents stress that the resources of migrants have been utilised too little 
in Norway and that this needs to change both for the benefit of the Norwegian 
society and the individuals involved: «[d]ouble allegiances, multiple identities and 
experiences from war and conflict have so far not been identified as a resource, 
but rather as a social challenge». «We must recognize that the identities of the 
future will extend beyond the national ones and that many people will have strong 
ties to several countries and communities» (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2009b: 70). By recognising the new reality of a diverse Norway in which a number of 
citizens have transnational ties, development assistance work can for example build 
on the advantages they may have as bridges between societies and on their key role 
in transferring social knowledge (Norad 2009: 19).
 Within the Norwegian MFA, regional units and the Peace and Reconciliation unit 
are among the ones that are expected to implement some of the above mentioned 
policies. Although these units do not have explicit strategies on how to do this as 
of yet, they relate to the topic through meetings, seminars and funding – often as a 
result of diaspora organisations and individuals knocking on their door. Especially 
the Somali and the Sri Lankan diaspora are mentioned frequently.50 Besides the 
fact that these two groups are among the ten largest non-western communities in 
Norway, another important reason for this is the level of transnational engagement 
and pro-activeness these two groups portray in engaging external actors (Erdal 
and Horst 2010: 41). A number of obstacles are often mentioned, which could 
provide further insight into the fact that in Norway, engagements in peacebuilding 
have so far not been focused on so much. In the Somali case, the high degree of 
fragmentation along regional, clan, socio-economic, religious, gender, generational 
and political lines is observed and considered highly problematic. Attempts 
to address this issue have focused on requests for umbrella organisations or 
nation-wide clan-representation. Furthermore, the Directorate of Integration and 
Diversity (IMDI) and the MFA have financially supported extensive dialogue efforts 
between sub-clans that were facilitated by the Nansen Peace Centre. In the Sri 
Lankan case, the level of politicisation is indicated to be a main concern, mostly 
leading to the decision not to engage. For those actors operating in Sri Lanka, it is 
highly problematic to be seen to engage with the Tamil diaspora, because of the 
tense relationship between this diaspora and the government. This is a fact not 
uncommon to refugee populations, including the Ethiopian and Eritrean diasporas, 
and deserves attention as a major challenge in engaging conflict-induced diasporas 
(Erdal and Horst 2010: 42). 
Non-governmental level
Governmental policy documents mention a number of concrete initiatives underway 
to facilitate diaspora engagement, including cost reduction and providing legal 
options for sending remittances and a pilot project for diaspora development in 
Norway. The MFA and Norad were responsible for setting up this pilot project, 
50 Smaller groups like Ethiopians, Eritreans, Congolese and others have also been important in the 
Norwegian context.
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involving the large Pakistani diaspora in Norway.51 The project was launched in 
June 2008 and implemented by a secretariat including the Development Fund 
and Norwegian Church Aid. The secretariat, and in particular Development 
Fund, has been responsible for practical implementation, management of grants, 
quality assurance and capacity building in the Norwegian-Pakistani community. 
A resource organisation, Sungi, has had the responsibility for capacity building 
and quality assurance of project implementation and partners in Pakistan (Erdal 
and Horst 2010: 12). Ten grants were awarded between 2008 and presently, 
with a match-funding ratio of 50-50 and a minimum input of 100,000 NOK.52 In 
addition, several of the participating organisations have received training from 
the Norwegian Development Network (Bistandstorget) through their development 
school (bistandsskolen), from Development Fund and Sungi. Furthermore, a number 
of other organisations have been in dialogue with the secretariat regarding new 
applications. The secretariat also established a consultative group of Norwegian 
Pakistanis, in order to respect the principle of openness and a participatory 
approach, as well as offering another channel for competence building related to 
development management. 
 The main purpose of the Pilot Project Pakistan was to prepare the ground for 
future solutions to the challenge of involving diasporas in development cooperation 
from Norway, with a focus on improving development impacts of diaspora 
engagements, putting them in a better position to compete for funding, building their 
competence and making more use of their expertise. A review that was published and 
presented in June 2010 (Erdal and Horst 2010) forms the starting point for discussions 
on what lessons can be learned from the pilot and how to apply these lessons to 
other groups. Recommendations include the establishment of a Diaspora Resource 
Centre, with the task of building competence and strengthening networking among 
and between diaspora organisations and Norwegian NGOs and CSOs. Project 
funding mechanisms are currently being looked into.
 The Norwegian NGOs involved in the Pilot Project Pakistan are among those 
most interested in the topic of diaspora engagement, and in particular Development 
Fund engages in a number of smaller initiatives that go beyond the Pakistani 
diaspora.53 For the duration of the pilot, one employee has been working on 
migration-development initiatives within Development Fund, which for example 
also included more peacebuilding-relevant engagements with Ethiopian and Tamil 
organisations and individuals in Norway. Larger NGOs face greater difficulty fitting 
migration-development activities in their mandate and practice, because they 
are implementing projects either directly or through local partners. Still, recently 
the topic has been discussed more, partly because of the pressure created by 
government policy and partly because of consistent pressure from diaspora groups. 
A number of NGOs have as a consequence created diaspora-components in new 
projects, or have focused on recruitment, but in general there is still considerable 
scepticism. Some employees within the larger organisations insist that they feel 
this is yet another trend ‘pushed’ on to them. Often, they question the motivations 
for this push, the government’s dedication to really commit to it, the possibility to 
51 The Pakistani community is one of the largest and most established migrant communities in 
Norway, having arrived in large numbers from the 1970s and consisting of 16,615 members 
(2009). Although surpassed in current numbers by Iraqis and Somalis, these communities arrived 
much more recently and started growing exponentially only from the late 1990s.
52 Equivalent to approximately € 12,500.
53 An important reason for this is that Development Fund did not actually work in Pakistan 
before, but is interested in diaspora engagement more generally. The topic fits their mandate as 
a solidarity organisation – they cooperate with a variety of Norwegian small- and medium-level 
actors.
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implement policies in practice, and the value of diaspora engagement in itself. As 
such, in general there has been very little concrete action taken by larger Norwegian 
NGOs to incorporate migration-development thinking in their programming.
Among smaller civil society actors engaged with the topic, in particular umbrella 
organisations and faith-based organisations, there seems to be more enthusiasm 
and involvement, but less resources and capacities. These small and often 
voluntary organisations would like to cooperate more with diaspora organisations, 
but they simply do not have the capacity and resources to provide them with all 
of the assistance and support needed for project planning and development. The 
experience is that helping them with this involves considerable capacity building 
and creates an extra workload which small organisations cannot really afford. 
The most common challenges in their involvement with diasporas are linked to 
communication problems, different ways of doing things, or what is often called a 
‘lack of structure’ within the diaspora organisations. Furthermore, internal power 
struggles within the organisations as well as among funders are indicated as 
major challenges. Still, those interviewed do put in extra efforts due to personal 
or ideological convictions, and often the work also seems to derive from religious 
beliefs. As such, there are a number of existing examples where smaller Norwegian 
organisations cooperate in various ways with diaspora organisations or individuals 
in implementing projects in countries of origin, including in Somalia and Sri Lanka.54
In sum, the situation in Norway is such that policies are remarkably well developed and 
the country is rapidly expanding its engagement in the field of migration-development. 
A focus on conflict-induced diasporas has so far largely been avoided in practice, 
mainly because of concerns about fragmentation and politicisation. At the same 
time, the numeric importance of conflict-derived diasporas in Norway means that it 
is unavoidable that, in the near future, these issues will need to be addressed and 
conflict-induced diasporas will be included in initiatives. Because many initiatives 
remain at the pilot level, the results from national policies are still quite limited. 
Furthermore, a cause of concern is the fact that the Norwegian case is strongly 
characterised by a top-down approach by some of the government actors involved – 
both towards NGOs and diaspora organisations. Yet because at least the policies are in 
place, there is space for a greater push from below, since government and NGOs can 
be held accountable by diaspora organisations and others concerned with migration-
development issues. Furthermore, existing smaller-scale and less coordinated civil 
society initiatives may benefit from the fact that policies are in place – for example 
because more funding and/or coordination may be made available in the near future.
2.5 Finland 55
Attempts to engage diasporas into peacebuilding are recent in Finland and are not 
guided by any general policies on migration-development or peacebuilding. The 
lack of specific policies may, at least partly, be due to Finland’s recent immigration 
54 For example, there are ten diaspora organisations that are members of FOKUS, a women 
development umbrella; the Nansen Peace Centre engages in various relevant activities; health 
associations and personnel work together with individuals and organisations of Somali and 
Tamil background; and partnerships exists between small CSOs or municipalities and the Somali 
diaspora.
55 This section is based on research conducted in Finland with an exclusive focus on the Somali 
diaspora. This choice was motivated by the size and visibility of this group in the country. The 
Somalis are also one of the most active immigrant groups in Finland engaging with external 
actors concerning activities in the countries of origin. The empirical data collected consists of 
29 interviews (11 with Finnish NGOs, 11 with Somalis, 7 with officials at the governmental and 
inter-governmental levels). 4 relevant events were also attended and observed. In addition, 21 
interviews from previous research undertaken within DIASPEACE integrated the above data. The 
research was conducted in the metropolitan area of Finland (cities of Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa). 
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history and to the comparatively small number of immigrants in the country. The 
government has however recognised immigration as a ‘development issue’ and 
several statements are contained in government resolutions. The importance of 
coherence between migration and development policies has been recognised 
in Finland and the Government Resolution on Government Migration Policy 
Programme, for example, states that «migration issues shall be comprehensively 
examined from the aspect of development policy in a bid to realise the benefits 
of Finland, the developing country concerned and the immigrants themselves» 
(Government of Finland Resolution 2006: 38-39). The authority responsible for 
realizing this is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA). Immigration and integration 
issues in general fall under the mandate of the Ministry of Interior. In order to try and 
achieve coherence between these bodies, representatives of the MFA, the Ministry 
of the Interior and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy are reported to 
meet on a regular basis to discuss development and international migration. 
Insitutional initiatives at the governmental level
In the Government Resolution on Development Policy (Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 2004) migration is defined as one of the areas to deal within the development 
policy coherence framework. The resolution states that «the Government will 
consider issues relating to migration and immigration more coherently from the 
perspective of development policy. It aims to support the positive effects of 
migration and prevent harmful effects, especially trafficking in human beings, 
prostitution, and other crimes associated with illegal immigration» (Finnish Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs 2004: 25). Migration is therefore recognised as a development 
issue and, if properly managed, it is also considered to contribute to development 
(ibid.). Within this policy framework there are however no guidelines on how to 
engage Finnish-based diaspora groups in development activities in the country 
of origin, nor is there a governmental-level policy on diaspora engagement. 
The engagements and cooperation that do exist thus take place within broad 
development cooperation policies and funding mechanisms. This can be seen in the 
light of Finnish integration policies, which are based on the ideals of an egalitarian 
welfare state, i.e. on the aim to integrate and ‘equalise’ all its members. From this 
perspective, Finland does not have a differentiated structure for diasporas, but the 
aim is to integrate them into existing systems. 
The access of diaspora groups/organisations to existing funding structures has 
been facilitated by the pro-activity of diasporas themselves. Somalis in this regard 
are among the most active groups in Finland in approaching external actors, making 
Somalia-related issues visible. Somalis are the fourth largest immigrant group in 
Finland after Russians, Estonians and Swedes, and the largest group of immigrants 
originating from Africa (Statistics Finland 2007). In 2008 Finland had a community 
of 10,647 people who spoke Somali as a mother tongue, of which 6,352 were born 
in Somalia (Statistics Finland 2008, out of this figure 3,346 are men and 3,006 are 
women).
An illustrative example in the Finnish case is the access gained by a number of 
Somali diaspora organisations to funding from the NGO development unit of the 
MFA. This funding for NGO development projects is divided into small-medium 
size CSO/NGO project support and large NGO programme support.56 The total 
share for support to NGO development, one of nine development cooperation 
56 In 2010, 11 native Finnish NGOs have a partner organisation status. The total share of fund-
ing for partner organisations is over half of the whole budget for NGO development cooperation. 
Organisations apply to get this status in open calls for proposals.
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budget lines, represented some 12.7% of the total yearly budget in 2008.57 
Development cooperation carried out by NGOs complements Finnish multi- and 
bilateral cooperation as well as the EU’s development cooperation. The overarching 
objective of NGO development cooperation is to further the UN Millennium 
Development Goals and to strengthen civil society in developing countries. A total 
of some 200 Finnish NGOs is currently involved in implementing development 
cooperation projects in over 80 different countries, or in sharing information on 
topics related to development.58 An indication of the activity of the Somali diaspora 
and its rather extensive level of networking with external actors compared to other 
diaspora groups in Finland comes from the NGO development unit at the MFA, 
which during the past years has received a large number of development project 
applications from Somali diaspora organisations but only very few from other 
diaspora groups (such as Kurdish, Ethiopian and Ghanaian organisations). The first 
development project carried out by a Somali association obtained external funding 
from the MFA in 2000. In 2009 a total of 141 small or medium size CSOs and 10 MFA 
partner NGOs were granted funding. Out of these, ten were Somali organisations 
and the absolute majority native Finnish NGOs/CSOs.59 It is however important to 
stress the funding criteria of the NGO development unit of the MFA: there is no 
‘Somali quota’ thus all project proposals of all NGOs/CSOs are evaluated on the 
same basis and those with the best project proposals and organisational capacity 
get funding. 
 The problem from the MFA’s point of view has been the low capacity of the 
Somali diaspora organisations in terms of management, reporting and their more 
general ability to follow the demanding bureaucratic procedures required in the 
running of their associations, in writing good quality applications and in realising 
development projects. The MFA has however directly contributed to support 
the capacity building measures for Somali organisations by funding the Finnish 
Somalia-Network.60 The MFA was not involved in the establishment of the network 
that was founded in 2004 by a few Somali and native Finnish NGOs/CSOs working 
towards development in Somalia in order to improve the quality of development 
cooperation of associations working in Somalia, as well as to produce and 
exchange information on issues relating to Somalia. Since its setup and until 2009, 
a native Finnish NGO – a partner organisation of the MFA with several development 
projects in Somalia – functioned as coordinating organisation for the Network. 
In 2004 the board of the Network met with officials from the MFA and a project 
proposal was submitted. The proposal was approved and the Network has been 
receiving funding from the MFA for the period 2005-2010.
 In 2010, the Network had 27 member associations (25 Somali and two native 
Finnish ones). This figure shows that not all Somali associations have joined the 
Network, based on an estimated number of 40-50 functioning Somali associations 
in Finland (Pirkkalainen 2009). The Finnish Somalia-Network arranges courses and 
training, events and discussions. The Network registered itself as an association 
in 2009, and in 2010 an executive director (a native Finn with a long research 
57 Source: MFA, NGO development cooperation website. See www.formin.fi/Public/default.aspx?n
odeid=15339&contentlan=2&culture=en-US. 
58 Ibid. 
59 These numbers have been estimated by the author by going through the names of organisations 
in the list of NGO development projects funded in 2009 (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
2009). On the basis of the authors’ familiarity with them, Somali organisations and native Finnish 
CSOs/NGOs were easily identified. The MFA does not differentiate diaspora associations and 
native Finnish NGOs in the selection processes. 
60 See www.somaliaverkosto.net.
29
Diasporas as partners 
in conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding
61 Source: IOM, Regional office in Finland. See: http://iom.fi/content/view/226/8
background on Somalis) was appointed in order to strengthen the Network and 
search for future funding. Financial support for an additional three year period was 
recently refused by the MFA, as the initial funding provided was seen as temporary 
in nature and the MFA states that it does not have a suitable funding mechanism 
for ongoing support to this kind of network. The future functioning of the Network 
therefore remains an open question.
 The network has recently started cooperating with the Finnish Refugee Council 
in a project for the capacity building of immigrant associations (Järjestöhautomo). 
The aim is to make a training plan for each member organisation in the network and 
carry out training to improve the functioning of associations. The Järjestöhautomo 
project is creating a system of certificates to associations: each association fulfilling 
the requirements set for the certificates can then use them in project proposals to 
show that the association is run in a professional manner. 
General training open to all NGOs and CSOs on development cooperation project 
management, reporting and proposal writing is also provided directly by the Service 
Centre for Development Cooperation (KEPA) and some Somali associations outside 
the network have participated in those. The network is much appreciated by the 
member organisations and many state to have greatly benefitted from its trainings. 
Some Somali associations outside the network, however, are suspicious of it. The 
MFA perceives it as a central network for capacity building, as well as for facilitating 
cooperation among organisations working in Somalia. 
Initiatives at the intergovernmental level
The IOM Regional Office in Helsinki has previously been implementing temporary 
return programmes for qualified nationals, such as the project “Return of Qualified 
Afghans from Finland”. The first project within the Migration for Development 
in Africa (MIDA) framework that the IOM Helsinki office coordinated was a pilot 
project: “Strengthening the Health Sector in Somaliland and Puntland through the 
Engagement of Somali Diaspora Health Professionals from Finland”. This one year 
project was launched in 2008 for the engagement of Somali health professionals. 
Preparation for the pilot had been taking place for years and the Somali diaspora in 
Finland had been active in promoting the idea, which again indicates the importance 
of the pro-activity of diasporas. The project coordinator at the IOM is of Somali 
origin. It was funded by the MFA unit for East and West-Africa. In addition to the 
MIDA health project, the IOM in Finland also takes part in a joint UNDP-IOM project: 
“The Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support – Migration for Development 
in Africa (QUESTS-MIDA)”. The purpose of this project is «to tap into key technical 
expertise among the Somali diaspora in a bid to help rebuild key governance 
foundations in parts of the country». It targets «Somalis with professional expertise 
in policy and legislation, human resources management, and public financial 
management living in North America, the UK and the Nordic countries».61 The IOM 
office in Finland started the outreach work for this project among Somalis in the 
Nordic countries in autumn 2009.
Initiatives of Non-Governmental and Civil Society Organisations 
Finland together with other Nordic countries have a very high number of voluntary 
associations compared to many other countries in the world (see Siisiäinen 2008), 
and also immigrants, in particular refugees, have been active in establishing 
voluntary associations (Saksela 2003, Pyykkönen 2005). This large number 
of voluntary organisations makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of 
initiatives between diaspora groups/individuals and native Finnish NGOs. 
In the Somali case, in addition to Somali diaspora associations accessing MFA NGO 
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development project funding, at the NGO and CSO level two-way recruitment and 
cooperation processes were identified: Somalis bringing their project ideas to native 
Finnish CSOs/NGOs, and large development NGOs recruiting Somali diaspora 
individuals on a professional basis (which was facilitated, to some extent, also by 
the pro-activity of diasporas). On the one hand, some individual Somalis have been 
unwilling to create their own associations and have chosen an alternative path to 
access funding from the MFA under the NGO development funding line. They have 
therefore initiated, or brought their project idea to an existing Finnish NGO. The first 
project of this kind started in 2003. On the other hand, large development NGOs 
have adopted diaspora recruitment strategies, although this is a rare phenomenon. 
An example of this kind is offered by Finn Church Aid, which initiated a project 
to support traditional and religious leaders in peace processes in Somalia. The 
project, started in 2008, is carried out in Somalia by Finnish Somalis who have been 
selected to carry out the work on the basis of their qualifications and expertise. Finn 
Church Aid however does not perceive this as being a diaspora project in a sense 
that it is not run in partnership with a diaspora organisation. Local institutions in 
Somalia are the formal project partners, and activities are carried out together with 
the Danish Refugee Council. Within the funding institution, the MFA, this particular 
peacebuilding project is considered important and innovative – being the only of its 
kind – but it has not come without scepticism from some members of the Somali 
community in Finland. 
 Alongside the experience of Finn Church Aid, six native Finnish NGOs or 
small CSOs that have engaged individual Somalis in their development or peace 
projects in Somalia were also identified. This sort of recruitment strategy was 
found in particular in small, voluntary-based CSOs, as they see an added value in 
engaging diasporas in their work. In many cases the active native Finns in these 
organisations affirm that without Somalis they would not be working in the country 
at all – not only for security reasons but also for the sake of local contacts. The 
case is different for larger professional development NGOs that have international 
branches and local offices in developing countries and thus do not necessarily see 
the same added value in working with diasporas. For example in one case a Somali 
individual approached a large development NGO in Finland with a project plan in 
Somalia, but was not involved in the actual planning and running of the project. In 
this case the implementation of the project was done through the local branch of 
the NGO in Somalia. 
In the Finnish case current examples of engagement of diasporas in development 
and peacebuilding work in all identified levels are to a large extent facilitated by 
the pro-activity of certain groups, as there are no general policies or specific 
guidelines on how diasporas should be engaged, nor specific funding mechanisms 
for diaspora projects. It is thus up to each group to get their voice heard and enter 
the mainstream structures and institutions. Although Somalis stand as one of the 
most visible groups that have entered some of their initiatives into mainstream 
development cooperation, they are still a minor actor in development and 
peacebuilding. It is difficult to assess whether the lack of policies and diversified 
funding structures for diasporas in development has been a deliberate choice, or 
whether it has to do with the short immigration history and comparatively small 
number of migrants in Finland, coupled with the fact that migration-development 
issues fall in between the mandates of the MFA and the Ministry of the Interior. 
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Taking stock of the policies and initiatives that have been put in place in the different 
countries considered, the pages that follow contain a critical review of some of the 
factors more often mentioned as favouring or hindering constructive interaction 
and partnership between diasporas and external actors in peacebuilding. 
Alongside broader considerations regarding the general ‘migration-development’ 
climate, other issues are discussed that emerged as being particularly relevant 
across all the countries considered. These refer to difficulties in dealing with the 
fragmentation of diaspora groups, in identifying the optimal form of diaspora-
third party collaboration and in assessing the effective added value of engaging 
diasporas as peacebuilding partners.  
3.1 Policies and instruments for diaspora engagement
The country case-studies illustrated above clearly show that a wealth of initiatives 
is ongoing which, in different ways, encourages collaboration between diasporas 
and external parties in activities that can contribute to peace processes in the 
countries of origin. The European countries considered, however, also show that 
the opportunities available for diasporas to become partners in peacebuilding 
fall largely under the broader policies and measures put in place in the field of 
migration-development. In this sense, the countries analysed present very different 
levels in the definition of explicit policies for the active engagement of diasporas in 
development. This not only proves a different sensitivity towards providing room 
for diaspora initiative, propositions and creativity, but it also strongly shapes the 
effective opportunities that exist in practice for interaction to take place between 
external actors and diasporas in the field of peacebuilding. 
 In Italy, for instance, the absence of policies on the issue of migration-
development at the level of central governmental authorities is responsible for the 
total lack of homogeneity within existing approaches on how to engage diaspora 
organisations. Despite few exceptions,62 diaspora engagement dynamics in 
development (and peacebuilding) are often framed within ‘pilot projects’ developed 
in a total vacuum of explicit institutional guidelines and declared strategies towards 
diaspora groups. At the opposite extreme, the case of the Netherlands exhibits a 
long tradition of attempting to link migration and development cooperation policies, 
accompanied by various dedicated policy memoranda. This commitment at the 
governmental level benefited from an active level of interaction with diasporas also 
at the level of civil society and non-governmental organisations. In addition, the 
existence of a common policy across different institutional ministries and divisions 
has favoured the activation of a number of collaborations with diasporas that fall 
more specifically in the peacebuilding field. In recent years a number of highly 
relevant migration-development policies have been developed also in Norway. 
Whereas there is little to no explicit government policy and practice on engaging 
diasporas in peacebuilding, existing documents do refer to diaspora groups and 
individuals coming from conflict regions. As noted also in the case of Germany, 
however, the recentness of Norwegian policies and of most ongoing initiatives 
currently make it too early to indicate what impact they might have on opportunities 
for diaspora engagement. A trend observed in Norway, moreover, is that initiatives 
to mainstream migration-development thinking have been initiated largely on the 
political level and trickled down onto NGOs and CSOs. The government of Finland, 
recognises migration as having a potential to contribute to development, but it has 
not elaborated any guidelines on how to actively engage Finnish-based diaspora 
groups. The engagements and cooperation that do take place can be seen to 
62 For instance at the local level, as in the case of the Province of Trento.
3. Critical factors for constructive 
   diaspora engagement
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reflect Finnish broader integration policies, as the aim is to ‘include’ diasporas 
in existing structures and funding mechanisms. This being the case, the pro-
activity of diaspora groups has to some extent facilitated migrants’ access to the 
development agenda.  
 Notwithstanding different forms and levels of national engagement in the 
development of dedicated policies, the overall picture is that of an extremely 
lively field, in which governments (national or local) are investing in migration-
development. Despite this general wealth of initiatives in diaspora engagement, 
however, «[t]he existence of institutions targeting Diasporas does not necessarily 
guarantee that resources and capacities devoted to diaspora policies are sufficient 
and sustainable» (Ionescu 2006: 37). In most of the country cases analysed within 
DIASPEACE access to funding and the existence of capacity building measures for 
diaspora organisations are the two main instruments further facilitating cooperation 
between them and external parties. 
In most cases, diaspora organisations access funding through existing, rather than 
tailor-made programmes. This situation is extreme in the case of Finland, where 
Somali diaspora organisations have been found to compete with native Finnish 
NGOs/CSOs in accessing MFA NGO development project funding. In this context, 
the integration of diaspora groups into Finnish society becomes a key, as in order 
to access funding they need knowledge of how to navigate the Finnish system and 
capacity to fulfil complex bureaucratic requirements. This requires considerable 
efforts in terms of time, commitment, motivation, resources and networks, thus 
making access to external funding for diaspora groups very challenging. In addition, 
the provision of resources to cover the ‘own funding’ share (15% of the whole 
project budget) makes the realisation of projects even more challenging for diaspora 
organisations. Most organisations receiving funding under this budget line are, 
in fact, native Finnish NGOs and the amounts received by Somali organisations 
are a very small portion of the overall budget. Similarly in the Norwegian case, an 
analysis of Norad’s lists of applicants and funding for small-scale support between 
2007-2010 (Erdal and Horst 2010), indicates that longer-existing mechanisms for 
obtaining funding through regular channels have been very difficult to access for 
diaspora organisations.63 Despite the many assets diaspora members bring with 
them, in fact, language issues, lack of sufficient knowledge about the Norwegian 
development cooperation system, and lack of organisational experience are some 
of the challenges they meet. Fieldwork in Germany also confirmed that in most 
cases, bureaucratic and institutional prerequisites to obtaining funding are still 
too high especially for smaller migrant organisations to succeed when competing 
with other NGOs and CSOs. Especially when applying for government sponsored 
funding, organisations have to provide a minimum amount of own resources and 
the sums are often too high for small voluntary migrant organisations to deal 
with. For this reason, these opportunities are usually only viable for long-standing 
and well-organised migrant organisations. In this context funding lines that are 
designed taking into account the particular requirements of less experienced or 
smaller migrant organisations by offering smaller budget lines and ongoing advice, 
such as the GTZ pilot programme, present an innovative approach to addressing 
this challenge. The situation of access to funding appears somewhat easier in the 
Netherlands. Here, in fact, diaspora organisations mainly access funds through 
the co-financing system open to Dutch-based civil society organisations, which 
is tailored for small-scale organisations and initiatives (be they diaspora or not). 
Although making it comparatively easier for diasporas to access funds, this system 
63 Out of 83 applications from 21 different countries (of which 8 from Somalia, 3 from Ethiopia and 
2 from Eritrea) 17 were funded (including 2 Somali and 1 Ethiopian organisation).
33
Diasporas as partners 
in conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding
however comes with the risk of relegating diaspora initiative to the small-scale and 
inhibiting their role as potential partners in larger development and peacebuilding 
actions. The authors of a research on diasporas as development agents in the 
Netherlands conducted a few years ago, for instance, observed that «Dutch aid 
agencies are placing increasing emphasis on support to migrant and refugee 
organisations (‘self-organisations’). However, the focus of this support is financial, 
aimed at training and coaching, not on fostering the participation of diasporas in 
the activities of mainstream aid organisations» (Groot and Gibbons 2006: 446) and 
therefore «genuine involvement of diasporas in mainstream Dutch development 
aid is limited. Currently, diasporas are considered as ‘resources’ or ‘tools’ for the 
development of their countries of origin and not as genuine partners» (ibid.: 448).
Emplacing channels for diaspora to access funding is not the sole measure to 
facilitate their active engagement in development and peacebuilding work. The 
research data confirmed that building the capacity of diaspora organisations is also 
a widespread priority in most countries. In the Netherlands, the provision of small-
scale grants for civil society initiatives under the Linkis system is accompanied by 
training and other capacity building measures that are often tailored to the specific 
needs of diaspora actors. In addition, many training initiatives have been observed 
in the Netherlands and in Germany that focus specifically on technical skills that are 
relevant for peacebuilding, rather than focusing exclusively on the more traditional 
issues of project and organisational management. Also in the Finnish case the 
existence of a capacity building measure for diaspora organisations is a strongly 
enabling factor. The Finnish Somalia-Network, created by Somali and native Finnish 
NGOs, has contributed to the development of the capacity of Somali organisations 
and facilitated cooperation. This network is the only one of its kind and can claim 
several achievements: first, it has brought together Somalis from different regions 
of Somalia; second, the trainings have raised the capacity of member Somali 
associations, as reflected in the growing number of Somali associations accessing 
funding from the MFA; and third, increased trust between Somali associations 
and the MFA as well as between Somali associations. MFA officials clearly see 
the process of associations becoming more professional over the years and they 
recommend organisations that are refused funding to join the Finnish Somalia-
Network in order to improve their capacity before applying again. However, as the 
funding from the MFA for the Network has only been temporary and is ending in 
2010, the sustainability of the Network is yet to be seen. The Dutch, German and 
Finnish cases just illustrated prove that a response is being given to the need for a 
more systematic guidance and tailor-made service to help diaspora organisations 
during all project stages. Elsewhere, this need has been registered but is not 
yet addressed. In Norway, for instance, although the Bistandskolen initiative 
was pointed out as being positive it is currently unable to cover all of diaspora 
organisations’ needs and there is therefore still a great lack of training opportunities 
properly tailored to diaspora individuals and organisations. Also in the Italian case 
there is growing and widespread recognition for the need to support diaspora 
organisations in terms of empowerment and capacity building initiatives delivered 
in the country of settlement. In spite of differences in the setup of available capacity 
building measures, the same difficulties in this sense are largely faced by diasporas 
in the countries considered that call for trainings to target migrants as a group 
with special needs. In particular, insufficient language proficiency makes it difficult 
to follow seminars that, for example, provide guidelines for funding application 
procedures. Also, full-time jobs, families to take care of etc. limit the time that can 
be spent on acquiring the knowledge needed and complicate the organisation of 
events and trainings that need to be planned during evenings or weekends. In the 
German context, several interviewees additionally pointed out that training and 
networking activities should ideally be organised on the sub-regional level to make 
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sure that interested diaspora representatives could participate without having to 
travel long distances. Meeting these demands, however, requires flexibility and 
additional commitments also on behalf of external parties. Finally, different cultural 
backgrounds often mean that participants are not used to the ‘way things work’ 
in the development world of the countries of residence. Encouraging diaspora 
participation in the development field has the benefit of creating diversity, but that 
benefit has limited meaning if there is a rigidity in trainings on how to do things 
right. As such, training sessions have to find a balance between teaching people to 
comply with requirements in order to be eligible for assistance, and leaving space 
for diversity and different ways of doing things. 
The wealth of initiatives observed in the countries considered within the 
DIASPEACE research shows that a conducive migration-development environment 
in the countries of residence is essential to create the basis for diasporas to fully 
participate in the development of their countries of origin, thus engaging in activities 
that can also contribute to peace and reconstruction processes. As recently 
underlined by de Haas, wide empirical evidence currently available shows that the 
development impacts resulting from migration are controversial, thus revealing 
«the naivety of recent views celebrating migration as self-help development ‘from 
below’. These views are largely ideologically driven and shift the attention away from 
structural constraints and the vital role of states in shaping favorable conditions for 
positive development impacts of migration to occur» (de Haas 2010: 227), meaning 
that governments have a decisive role in channelling the potential of migration into 
positive development achievements. This statement holds particularly true when the 
specificities of conflict-derived diasporas and their opportunities for engagement 
in peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts are concerned. As discussed in 
the introduction to this paper, in fact, diasporas can notoriously also have a 
degenerative impact in conflict-characterised settings. The case-studies presented 
in this paper show that, little (if any) attention is paid to monitoring these factors 
during collaboration. 
 In addition to uncovering the importance of existing policy frameworks for 
diaspora engagement and of ongoing initiatives to facilitate access to funding, 
training and assistance for diaspora organisations, DIASPEACE fieldwork also 
shows that many initiatives are dependent on the active engagement of a few 
extremely dedicated individuals in governmental and non-governmental sectors. 
This is a cause for concern as, combined with high staff turn-over, it makes 
migration-development policies and practices highly vulnerable. 
3.2 Diasporas as fragmented actors
Alongside the professional capacity of diaspora organisations, which is greatly 
addressed by investing in capacity building measures and by favouring access to 
project funding, an issue of widespread concern among external actors wishing to 
establish collaboration with migrants lies in the fragmented nature of diaspora groups. 
 Especially when cooperating with diaspora organisations from conflict-
regions, their levels of fragmentation as well as politicisation are a major cause 
of preoccupation. The Somali case is just one relevant example of a high degree 
of fragmentation, which reflects divisions along regional and clan affiliations, as 
well as along generational, religious, political and gender lines. The Ethiopian 
and Eritrean diaspora also appear to be strongly affected by both fragmentation 
and politicisation. These divisions within diaspora groups may be the result of a 
transferral of the conflict from the country of origin, a factor that can threaten the 
peacebuilding potential of their actions. Research conducted in Italy found that, 
according to the convenience of the interlocutor, fragmentation is sometimes 
denied and sometimes treated as a taboo that is enshrined in the culture of the 
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Somali people. The adoption of similar attitudes on behalf of diaspora groups 
clearly makes it extremely difficult for external actors wishing to approach them 
to understand who they are dealing with. In most of the countries considered, in 
fact, understanding who the organisations represent is voiced as a major concern 
by governmental institutions, NGOs and CSOs, who find it difficult to identify 
who to trust and, ultimately, who to cooperate with. Because of fragmentation 
among the diaspora, moreover, there is a perceived threat that cooperation may 
easily become politicised. While fragmentation and politicisation are of course 
legitimate concerns, this should however not lead to the conclusion that diaspora 
actors cannot be partners in development (Erdal and Horst 2010: 10). Research 
undertaken on diaspora mobilisation for homeland development and peacebuilding 
within DIASPEACE, in fact, has shown that the Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somali 
diaspora do make crucial contributions to the lives and livelihoods of people in 
the countries of origin (Warnecke 2010). It should, however, be underlined that 
diaspora organisations from the Horn of Africa are more often found to contribute 
to peacebuilding processes in an implicit way, by promoting development and 
fighting exclusion, thus indirectly addressing the root causes of the conflict. When 
collaboration is established with third parties, however, this general focus on 
development rather than peacebuilding objectives may encourage the latter to 
ignore the factors behind the conflict and to expect the diaspora to solve these 
issues internally ahead of establishing collaboration. This is a risky path, as it means 
that external actors may become blind to how conflict and divisions in the country 
of origin may reflect also in the diaspora.
The fieldwork collected in the countries covered by the research largely confirms 
that for «external actors, it is crucial that individuals and organizations they support 
are seen as legitimate actors by the migrant communities they represent» (Horst 
2008: 2). In the case of absence of clear interlocutors among the diaspora, in fact, 
there is a risk that only few successful individuals are able to gain direct access to 
key people in governmental and non-governmental organisations. If these brokers 
use their position to deny access to others, their position becomes one of great 
power (Erdal and Horst 2010). In many countries, the distribution of resources 
among diaspora groups on behalf of donors has also proved extremely delicate, 
particularly when they originate from conflict or post-conflict countries. In such 
cases, «attempts to support diaspora organizations often display a rather literal 
approach to the issue: The major parties to a conflict are identified and resources 
are then distributed equally between organizations representing those parties» 
(Horst and Gaas 2009: 4). More often, however, there is an explicit preference for 
collaborating with umbrella organisations that are able to represent larger networks 
and disseminate information among their members. In Germany, for instance, 
governmental authorities both on the local and regional levels have supported 
or even initiated efforts to form African umbrella associations. In its latest policy 
memorandum on migration-development, the Dutch Government also openly states 
its willingness to support the creation of umbrella organisations.64 Co-Financing 
Agencies such as Oxfam and Cordaid, moreover, have played an important part in 
favouring the establishment of unifying networks and platforms among the diaspora 
resident in the Netherlands, particularly through the commitment to a shared 
thematic goal.65 The Finnish Somalia-Network can also be recalled as an attempt 
to deal with fragmentation in Finland by bringing together different organisations 
64 See the country section on the Netherlands of this paper (p. 19).
65 The case of the Multicultural Women Peacemakers Network (MWPN), which brings together 
diaspora women from different nationalities with an aspiration to contribute to peacebuilding 
processes in their countries of origin offers a particularly fitting example.
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working in different parts of Somalia. In order to facilitate cooperation and 
information sharing, the politics of Somalia have deliberately been excluded from 
the network’s agenda that focuses, instead, on development work/humanitarianism 
as a bridging theme. The clear identification of unifying common goals has been 
recalled by many interviewees across the countries examined as one of the 
key elements leading to the success, rather than the failure, of these network 
experiences. Alongside the already cited case of the MWPN in the Netherlands, 
another positive example encountered in Finland is IOM’s MIDA Health Somalia 
project. In this case, divergent views on regional and political fragmentation have 
been reduced by focusing on the common cause of health needs in the country 
and a common professional field. Less successful attempts to establish network 
organisations were observed in Germany, Norway and Italy. In NRW, the African 
diaspora umbrella organisation Afrikanischer Dachverband NRW e.V. has strongly 
suffered from internal conflicts and has been criticised by some as having been 
initiated top-down rather than on the basis of grassroots initiatives and needs. 
Similarly in Italy, the only attempt by the Italian MFA to engage the Somali 
diaspora for peacebuilding resulted in a failure, as funds were distributed to the 
members of an externally-driven umbrella organisation, therefore legitimising one 
group at the expense of others. Interestingly, the Italian case also offered few 
examples of organisations exhibiting a mixed membership, composed by Somali 
diaspora individuals in addition to people with other backgrounds as well as 
Italians. In these cases, the variety of the organisations’ membership is perceived 
as offering new opportunities and as overcoming the divisions occurring within 
Somali diaspora organisations. 
The picture just outlined suggests that to expect the diaspora to solve their internal 
divisions as a pre-condition for collaboration is misleading, especially when the 
aspiration is to work together with them in conflict settings. 
3.3 Collaboration: with whom and how?
The considerations made so far show that collaboration with the diaspora is 
frequently conceived in terms of interaction with migrant associations and that a 
strong emphasis in placed on providing the latter with support to implement their 
own projects. Evidence from the country profiles presented above, however, also 
shows that relevant interaction between diaspora and third parties is in fact far 
more varied, both in terms of the type of diaspora actor with whom collaboration 
is established and in terms of the content and nature of the collaboration itself. 
The range of possible types of cooperation is shaped firstly by the diverse nature 
of diaspora organisations. The data collected within DIASPEACE shows that 
diaspora initiatives can be established at different levels, ranging from professional 
networks, to community initiatives, to migration-development associations, to 
umbrella and network organisations.66 Alongside the diverse nature of these 
associative initiatives, moreover, the possibility for third parties to engage diaspora 
individuals should also be taken into account. 
Fieldwork has also shown that peacebuilding-relevant processes of interaction 
with the diaspora can take many forms, ranging from consultation processes 
during the formulation of policies and programmes, to the provision of financial and 
other support to the projects initiated by diaspora organisations, to the inclusion 
66 An attempt to identify a typology of diaspora initiatives geared towards development that can 
assist external actors in partnering with relevant diasporas is offered in Ionescu (2006). The 
characteristics that diaspora organisations should bear to be suitable partners specifically in 
peacebuilding, based on earlier DIASPEACE research, is explored in Sinatti (2010). The same topic 
is also touched upon by Zunzer (2004). 
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of diaspora in existing projects, to the joint running of projects, as well as to the 
recruitment of diaspora individuals on behalf of mainstream NGOs.67
Consultation processes with the diaspora have recently become increasingly 
popular in some European countries, as a way of rationalizing development policies 
(Ionescu 2006: 24-25). The case of the Netherlands shows that consultations in the 
definition of migration-development policies provide the opportunity for migrants 
to identify their potential role and to voice their opinions in a participatory manner. 
According to Libercier and Schneider, consultation of this form «at first allows 
actors to become aware of their complementarity and can subsequently make their 
initiatives more consistent, effective and lasting» (1996: 62). Again in the Netherlands 
consultations take place also in the definition of development policies towards 
specific countries, therefore gaining a strong peacebuilding relevance when the 
countries at stake are characterised by conflict. Similarly in Norway various units 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are open to meetings with diaspora members, 
organise seminars and at times consult diaspora members. Alongside these formal 
initiatives, a number of more informal consultation processes were observed in Italy 
and Finland, where rather widespread contacts exist between the Somali diaspora 
and Italian/Finnish politicians and institutions. In Finland, for instance, many Somali 
groups and individuals are actively lobbying on issues concerning Somalia with 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which is open to meetings with diaspora members. 
Evidence from this country, moreover, shows that the diaspora can be consulted 
also in project formulation. The most notable example is provided by the IOM MIDA 
programme “Strengthening the Health Sector in Somaliland and Puntland through the 
Engagement of Somali Diaspora Health Professionals from Finland”, the initiation of 
which was characterised by a strong diaspora pro-activity. From IOM’s point of view, 
the commitment and motivation on behalf of many health professionals of Somali 
origin, who had been promoting the idea for many years, was an essential starting 
point justifying an engagement in the project. 
Collaboration between diasporas and external actors is more explicit in the case of 
partnerships either supporting the projects implemented independently by diaspora 
organisations, or by jointly running projects initiated by one or the other party. In this 
sense, the country case-studies analysed confirm that partnership is more often 
mediated through the civil society sector and very rarely entails a direct involvement 
of government institutions. Although the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway68 and Finland are providing direct financial support to diaspora 
organisations, their numbers are still extremely limited. In Italy, a few cases of local 
authorities attempting to directly promote a ‘partnership’ modality when approaching 
diaspora organisations have resulted in successful collaborations with the Somali 
diaspora in Regione Toscana, in the city of Milan and in Trentino. More often, however, 
public authorities view native development associations as ‘trustworthy’ and having 
the capacities as well as the legitimacy to work in the migration field. The result is 
that Italian NGOs often speak in the name of migrant organisations, thus generating 
a crowding out effect of the latter on matters of their concern (Caponio 2005, 
Mezzetti and Guglielmo 2010). Similarly in Norway, many NGOs perceive that despite 
the government’s declared commitment to ensure that the particular competence 
of diaspora groups is utilised (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009a: 101), 
implementation is largely left to the civil society sector. Especially the larger 
67 See also de Haas (2006: 4) for an attempt to list the different ways in which migrants can be 
involved in development policies.
68 In Norway this direct relationship is channelled through Norad, which, being a directorate 
under the MFA, Development Cooperation, is however a government agency.
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Norwegian NGOs consider the push to cooperate with diasporas as a burden that 
does not necessarily fit their mandate. Small voluntary organisations, instead, seem to 
engage more willingly with the diaspora on the basis of strong personal and religious 
motivations. Likewise in Finland some small, voluntary-based CSOs have been 
approached by Somali individuals who expressed a desire to bring their project idea 
to an existing native Finnish organisation. In these few identified cases, cooperation 
was based on tight and trusted personal relationships between native Finns and 
Somalis. The degree of joint involvement in the actual project implementation varies 
strongly across these cases, as well as in similar ones observed in the Netherlands. 
The Care/NedSom Diaspora Partnership Programme, for instance, stands out as an 
example of a well balanced participation of both parties in the running of a project. 
Field data shows that fruitful forms of collaboration between diasporas and third 
parties may also be established beyond the limited time-frame imposed by project-
based cooperation. Whereas in Norway, Germany and Finland there is still an extreme 
under-representation in ministries and NGOs of employees who have a migrant 
background, in other countries it was observed that migrants are being incorporated 
as workers in mainstream development organisations. In the Netherlands, a number 
of external actors have adopted staff diversity policies in the belief that a strong 
multicultural and multi-religious community within an organisation facilitates the 
crossing of cultural bridges also when working in development and peacebuilding in 
the field.69 In Italy native NGOs recruited Somalis and consolidated relationships with 
them already during the major humanitarian crises occurring in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. These relationships continued during the Somali civil war when Somali 
officers became essential human resources for Italian NGOs’ activities in Somalia. 
At that time, Italian NGOs hired Somalis, enabling them to become development and 
humanitarian workers, many of whom are still employed in this sector or act as ‘key 
informants’ on the Somali crises. Also in Finland, although examples are rare, the 
peace building project in Somalia carried out by Finn Church Aid has hired qualified 
Somali individuals to carry out work in the field. Similarly within the MIDA health 
programme mentioned earlier an individual of Somali origin has been recruited on a 
professional basis in the role of project coordinator. In both these projects the pro-
activity of diasporas has facilitated the realisation of projects. Although some might 
criticise these recruitment practices as threatening the independence of diaspora 
voices, in the long-term this strategy has also proved valuable in enhancing the 
professional capacity of the diaspora. In the Netherlands, in particular, cases exist 
of individuals gaining professional capacity within established organisations prior to 
founding independent diaspora associations. This has not only allowed to enhance 
the diaspora’s capacity to set up and run development organisations in a professional 
way, but it has also allowed strong and historically grounded strategic alliances 
between organisations to become established. 
 In more general terms, efforts to promote cooperation between government 
institutions, NGOs and CSOs on the one hand and diaspora individuals and 
organisations on the other are increasingly common across the countries 
considered. Although different countries present different levels of active 
engagement in this area, «the concept of networking now runs through nearly all 
current international migration programmes» (Smith and van Naerssen 2009: 20). In 
many countries, moreover, a certain degree of self-initiative is expected on behalf of 
diaspora groups (de Haas 2006). In this sense, it should be underlined that diaspora 
organisations studied within DIASPEACE do not passively wait for external parties 
to reach out to them and have, in fact, shown a high level of pro-activeness. When 
it comes in particular to actions in the field of peacebuilding, however, the input of 
69 This finding contrasts with the results of an earlier study of migration-development in the 
Netherlands by Groot and Gibbons (2006).
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external third parties can be a hugely facilitating factor. Not only, in fact, situations 
that will stimulate opposing parties to work together, to overcome conflicts and to 
identify the grounds for the definition of shared goals can be initiated more easily 
from the outside, but external organisations with an established track record in 
peacebuilding are also in a position to deliver their knowledge and experience 
to diaspora organisations. Finally, the diversity of collaboration forms observed 
in the countries analysed suggests that «there can be no simple or single way to 
implement this collaboration» and that the latter «must be continually ‘reinvented’ 
in practice» (Libercier and Schneider 1996: 12). Each country should therefore 
explore its own models, depending on the nature of diaspora and non-diaspora 
actors present on the scene, as well as on locally available opportunities and 
resources. Most importantly, however, the data collected shows that effective 
diaspora engagement in peacebuilding is more often the product of a long-lasting 
relationship of collaboration, allowing to test appropriate working modes and to 
establish relationships of mutual trust. 
3.4 Diasporas in peacebuilding: assessing the added value
Despite an overall wealth of attempts to establish collaboration with diasporas in 
development and peacebuilding efforts, the DIASPEACE research also observed 
a certain lack of clarity – on behalf of third parties – of what the relative added 
value might be. Even when policies and mandates mention a commitment to 
work with diasporas, the added value is rarely explicitly identified. Exemplary in 
this sense is the Policy memorandum on migration-development adopted by the 
Dutch government, which recognises migrants’ potential while also suggesting that 
migrants themselves «could do more to identify their own potential added value» 
(Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008: 55). This quote reflects a strong burden 
that is frequently placed on the diaspora to prove itself and to take responsibility 
in revealing and realising its own potential. When it comes, more specifically, to 
peacebuilding this general uncertainty on the specific value added of diaspora 
participation is even more evident. 
This picture at the organisational and institutional level is contrasted on the one 
hand by the personal opinions expressed by individuals working within them and, 
on the other hand, by research-based evidence on the numerous advantages 
of engaging diasporas in peacebuilding uncovered within earlier DIASPEACE 
research. Many individuals working for the external actors consulted, in fact, 
articulated a variety of positive views on diaspora participation, on the basis of 
the opportunities they have personally experienced. Some informants mentioned 
the richness that diversity in general creates and the benefits in terms of language 
and culture, others the possibility to access otherwise inaccessible areas, others 
that engaging diasporas falls within a broader commitment to the empowerment 
of local communities that is the basis of a long-term development vision. External 
actors wishing to support private initiatives in development and peacebuilding 
(such as through the Linkis system in the Netherlands) even suggested that 
diaspora organisations are more motivated to work in fields and in countries that 
are unattractive for other civil society actors. Numerous small or middle-sized 
organisations, especially those with solidarity work included in their mandate, also 
see potential in working together with the diaspora. 
 Earlier research conducted within the DIASPEACE project further substantiates 
these claims as it uncovered a number of ways in which diaspora engagement in 
peacebuilding does represent an added value that are worth briefly recalling here.70 
70 For a more detailed discussion see Horst and Gaas (2009), Pirkkalainen and Abdile (2009), 
Warnecke et al. (2009) and Warnecke (2010). 
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Diaspora ties with their countries of origin are generally at the basis of a strong 
affective capital (Ionescu 2006) made of emotional commitment and personal 
motivation to contribute to home-country advancement.71 Migrants also dispose of 
knowledge on cultural practices, demands and current developments, meaning that 
individuals with a diaspora background can participate more effectively than other 
actors in peacebuilding processes. In these cases, in fact, «people in the homeland 
are more accepting and willing to listen to advice from members of the diaspora 
rather than other foreigners» (Bercovitch 2007: 35), thus enhancing local feelings 
of ownership.72 The commitment of diasporas, moreover, is of a long-term nature, 
a factor that is key in favouring the sustainability of peace processes. Examples 
of diaspora-run projects have been observed in Finland, Germany and in the 
Netherlands, in which activities have continued after the end of external funding.73 
 Diasporas are also more likely than other mainstream development actors to 
think ‘out of the box’ and advance new and creative ideas on how to promote 
development and peacebuilding (Horst 2008). There are several examples especially 
in the fields of reconciliation and post-conflict recovery where migrant organisations 
have initiated dialogue processes especially on the local levels, including cases of 
cooperation in the countries of residence with organisations from other countries or 
with organisations belonging to inimical groups that would not have been possible 
‘back home’. Migrants and their organisations, moreover, are at times able to 
harness long-term trustful contacts with regional or local authorities and NGOs in 
their countries of origin as well as in those of residence. This calls into question 
the important bridging role that can be played by diasporas. DIASPEACE data has 
revealed that the Somali community in particular has pursued an explicit network-
building strategy, allowing Somali organisations to develop working relations 
beyond the local sphere and to act trans-nationally as well as trans-locally. In 
addition, residence outside the country of origin has allowed the diaspora to gain 
relevant competences and skills that can be transferred to the country of origin. 
Return projects for qualified nationals observed in Finland and the Netherlands 
have allowed the Somali and Ethiopian diaspora to play a pivotal role in long-term 
reconstruction processes of their countries. 
 The strong local nature of diaspora ties with the home-country, often established 
in the region of origin at the family and grassroots level, puts diaspora initiative 
at risk of being biased in the selection of the most needing beneficiaries. On the 
basis of strong local ties, however, migrants are also more likely to have access 
to the more isolated regions of a country, an asset that is particularly relevant in 
conflict situations. Evidence from the Somali diaspora, in particular, has shown that 
diaspora organisations are in a key position to deliver aid to Somalia, as they can 
operate in places that are inaccessible to international actors.74 The small and local 
scale of diaspora driven initiatives often also makes them more cost-efficient, as 
71 These commitment and motivation, moreover, have proved to remain equally strong in times of 
crises (Weiss Fagen and Bump 2006).
72 Although the opposite has also been said to be true in a number of cases. An example from the 
Ethiopian diaspora is illustrated in Koser (2007).
73 Although in some cases these projects are recent and longer term sustainability is therefore 
difficult to assess
74 The rise of extreme Islamist groups of Al-Shabab in Central South Somalia has, however, also 
restricted a access to certain areas. Ethiopian and Eritrean diasporas also suffer from limited 
access to their countries of origin should be mentioned. In Ethiopia, in particular, the recent 
‘Proclamation to Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies’ prevents 
organisations that receive more than 10% of their funding from abroad from engaging in human 
rights and advocacy projects. This law, introduced in 2009, seriously affects activities promoted 
also by the diaspora. 
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they rely on lighter structures when compared to the internal management costs 
imposed by larger NGOs.75 
 These abilities of diaspora organisations can surely be regarded as a resource 
to be strengthened and used to the benefit of development processes in their 
countries of origin. The effectiveness of diaspora contributions to peacebuilding 
and reconstruction efforts, however, also clearly depends upon the specific 
elements of each situation and these conditions can be subject to change over 
time. A clear example of this comes from the Italian case, where NGOs that had 
previously recruited Somalis among their permanent staff do not currently see 
an added value in involving more recently arrived Somalis into their development 
programmes, because they see them as bearers of personal interests with a desire 
to exploit the NGOs’ resources for their personal/clan profit. Returnees who lived 
for a certain time in Italy and have returned to Somalia, instead, have established 
organisations there through which they maintain ties and collaborations with Italian 
NGOs, who see them as ‘trustworthy’ partners with ‘bridging’ potential. There is, 
therefore, a greater need to assess the specific added value that collaboration with 
the diaspora entails on a case-by-case basis. A diaspora member, in fact, should 
not be automatically regarded as an expert and knowledge of the country of origin 
needs to be complemented with knowledge and skills regarding conflict and peace. 
A particular concern is expressed by many external actors that the diaspora carries 
biased opinions of the conflict in the country of origin. A joint involvement between 
the diaspora and external actors in peacebuilding, in this sense, will be beneficial 
to both parties as well as to the target country itself. By collaborating, the outsider 
positioning of external parties can counter the insider one of diaspora organisations 
and hence minimise the associated negative effects. Collaborating in this way 
allows both parties to strengthen each other’s weaknesses, thereby resulting in a 
meaningful collaboration. 
75 Interestingly, larger NGOs consulted within DIASPEACE use the same argument of cost-
efficiency and economies of scale in favour of their own projects.
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Four main policy recommendations can be drawn from the case material and 
discussion presented in the previous pages. 
a) Be politically engaged 
Research conducted within DIASPEACE has shown that diasporas have a strong 
tendency to organise and mobilise themselves for the advantage of their countries 
of origin. Fieldwork among external actors collaborating with diasporas has 
nonetheless also shown that their engagement is highly favoured by the adoption of 
clear policies and measures favouring diaspora engagement at the national level. 
Clear migration-development policies overcome a vacuum and contrast the 
pulverisation of efforts undertaken in absence of shared guidelines and principles. 
Internal policy coherence also plays a key role in creating an enabling environment, 
as responsibilities for issues relating to migration, development cooperation and 
peacebuilding often fall in between mandates and are distributed across different 
ministries and bodies. Good communication should also be established between 
all the different actors on the scene (including those at the institutional, as well 
as at NGO and CSO level). Coordination between these parties will favour the 
complementarity of interventions, avoiding overlapping and duplication of efforts. 
Good coordination might also contribute to overcoming the risk of competition 
between diaspora organisations over limited available resources. Coherence, 
communication and coordination can however only be achieved through long-
lasting and durable commitment and by integrating co-development strategies also 
with direct agreements signed with migrants’ countries of origin.
 Policy frameworks on their own have limited impact if they are not followed 
by measures and instruments facilitating partnership with the diaspora. Many 
countries have devised small-scale funding schemes accessible to civil society 
and/or diaspora initiatives, combining them with comprehensive capacity building 
measures providing support and advice structures as an instrument for migrant 
organisations to test, practice and build their management and implementing 
capacities. The joint combination of these two tools no doubt represents a winning 
strategy, however requiring significant resources in order to make a critical 
difference. Most countries, in fact, lament the scarce reach of existing resources 
and tools compared to potential needs. In addition, building the capacity of 
diaspora organisations is exposed to the danger of patronising, as it may push 
them to ‘speak the same development language’ as their third party counterparts. 
This may indeed make collaboration easier, but it may also suffocate opportunities 
for exploiting the huge potential for innovation, creativity and thinking ‘out of 
the box’ that diaspora organisations carry with them. Policies and initiatives 
should therefore also take stock of the wealth of existing migrant engagement in 
development and peacebuilding and muster an effort on behalf of third parties to 
‘mobilise themselves’ (de Haas 2006, Horst 2008) to engaging with diasporas also 
in alternative ways. Finally, policies and measures should set realistic prospects 
and avoid expecting migrants to succeed where NGOs and other development 
cooperation actors have already failed. The «limited success of much 
development practice so far» has in fact led to the rising «hope that migrants 
may be able to overturn current developmental failures and foster development» 
(Raghuram 2009: 103-104).
b) Be realistic
While policies and measures generally relating to migration-development can favour 
cooperation with diasporas also in peacebuilding, collaborative actions in this field 
must take into account a number of additional challenges. 
 The fragmentation that characterises diaspora groups, particularly those 
originating from conflict-affected countries, is notoriously an issue of concern 
among external actors. Engaging diasporas for effective peacebuilding and 
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
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reconstruction requires third parties to learn more about the context in the country 
of origin and the specificities of the diaspora in the country of residence prior 
to seeking a joint engagement. More importantly, the unrealistic expectation of 
working with a homogeneous diaspora must be overcome and modalities identified 
that allow to acknowledge the diversity of diaspora views and interests. Observed 
attempts to encourage the formation of diaspora networks and platforms may 
be questioned as being the best solution to deal with diaspora fragmentation. 
Should the umbrella nature of diaspora organisations become a requirement for 
collaboration with third parties, in fact, there is a strong risk of these organisations 
becoming externally induced. Evidence, in fact, has shown that the most successful 
of these cases are based on a good deal of diaspora initiative and ownership in 
the process, as well as on the identification of clear shared themes along which 
networks and platforms are constructed.
c) Think innovatively
Third parties have shown to be currently working with diasporas in an extreme 
variety of ways. Whereas the most conventional form of collaboration is still largely 
associated with external actors’ support to diaspora-initiated projects, many 
alternative forms of interaction have the potential to have a lasting impact on 
peacebuilding processes. Interested third parties should therefore be more explicitly 
creative in the nature and contents of collaboration. The latter can take the variable 
form of consultation for policy and programme definition, incorporation by way of 
recruitment, donor-receiver relation, full partnership in joint project implementation, 
the construction of longer term strategic alliances, etc. The possibility, moreover, 
should also be explored of looking beyond diaspora organisations when identifying 
relevant partners. Collaboration, in fact, can be sought in more creative ways, 
for instance attempting to incorporate diaspora informal networks or individuals. 
Diversifying the diaspora interlocutors with whom collaboration is sought 
might even assist in overcoming some of the challenges posed by diaspora 
fragmentation. In addition, the fact that many diaspora organisations operate 
at the transnational level and are able to mobilise resources relying on broader 
networks than those of external actors may require the latter to explore new 
approaches to collaboration (Horst 2008). This statement calls for a greater 
openness also in the contents, as well as in the forms, of possible collaboration. 
It would be presumptuous, on behalf of third parties, to expect the diaspora to 
adapt to existing ways of doing development and peacebuilding without showing 
a willingness to explore new avenues. This would allow to better harness the 
potential for innovation and alternative ways of understanding development and 
peacebuilding that the diaspora might bring forward. 
 Whichever form collaborations might take, the DIASPEACE research has 
shown that the most fruitful examples are rooted in long-term processes that 
expand beyond the timeframe of specific collaboration/partnership on a single 
project or initiative. It is essential, therefore, that mutual trust is built through good 
communication, regular exchange, consultation and networking opportunities. It is 
essential that trust is built both ways, both on behalf of external actors who need 
the time and resources to identify and invest in adequate diaspora partners, and on 
behalf of diaspora organisations who need to find assurance that external actors 
can be equal and valuable partners. Diaspora engagement, in this sense, can be 
touted as a sign of breaking the unequal structures of development cooperation, 
transforming its ‘objects’ into ‘actors’. 
 The need to identify strategies to handle diaspora fragmentation as well as the 
variety of ways in which collaboration might be established both call for external 
actors to be flexible and open to negotiation in collaborating with diaspora actors. 
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d) Critically assess the value added of engaging diaspora 
Lastly, an effective collaboration with diaspora requires a clear assessment of 
the unique added value of the diaspora in peacebuilding. Diaspora organisations 
should not be left to identify their potential alone. Better alliances should be built 
to favour the exchange of experiences in a way that can truly assess the value 
added on a case-by-case basis. Although the DIASPEACE research has already 
made huge progress in unravelling the complexity of diaspora’s role in peace and 
reconstruction processes in the Horn of Africa, detailed knowledge of these issues 
should be more easily accessible also to development actors and diaspora groups 
operating in the field. Despite the fact that many opportunities already exist for 
exchange of information, there is a greater need for these to constructively assist 
diaspora and external parties in identifying conditions for success. This can more 
easily take place when discussion is organised around clear issues, be they defined 
geographically (on specific countries or regions) or thematically (on peacebuilding-
relevant topics). In particular, the ways in which different collaborations and actions 
can directly address the root causes of conflicts must be identified, taking into 
account both cross-cutting elements and factors deriving from the nature of the 
partnership and/or that are country-specific. Similar opportunities for learning 
lessons and establishing best practices would also mitigate the risk of diaspora 
engagement in peacebuilding becoming a purely theoretical advantage and leaving 
the associated difficulties taboo. 
The DIASPEACE research has revealed many ways in which diasporas originating 
from the Horn of Africa successfully contribute to peacebuilding processes. The 
project has also explored the opportunity that this wealth of initiatives represents 
for other development and peacebuilding actors, who could partner with diasporas 
in an effort to better promote peace and reconstruction in war-torn countries. It 
is a hope that the insight into country policies and experiences, together with the 
recommendations contained in this paper will offer interested external parties with 
valuable suggestions for action. 
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